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JUSTICE STORY'S DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
AND THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR A NEUTRAL
PRINCIPLE IN
The Charles River Bridge Case
RETRIEVING STORY'S DISSENT FROM CLIO'S JUNKPILE
A traditional and altogether legitimate test of a great Supreme Court dis-
sent is its eventual vindication by a later Court.I Justice Joseph Story's dissent
in The Charles River Bridge Case,2 however, remains perhaps the most
famous American dissent which does not meet this test, yet still qualifies as
great. It is a singular distinction which testifies to legal academics' enduring
fascination with Story's genius and his Bridge opinion. s Because Story's
holding was never adopted, scholars assume that the dissent is of merely
historical, rather than legal, significance. 4 Accordingly, one historian recently
dismissed Justice Story's "legal cosmology ... [as] a relic of history, a curiosi-
ty on Clio's junkpile."5
Unfortunately, Story's Bridge cosmology has been dismissed only because
it has been largely misunderstood. Far from being a relic, Story's theory of
the Constitution has been a tenacious force in American law. The ultimate
issues Story confronted in the Bridge Case concerned the most delicate ques-
tions of separation of powers6 - the very same which continue to perplex the
Copyright © 1978 by C. Lee Mangas.
'See A. BARTH. PROPHETS WITH HONOR xi-21 (1974 rpt. pbk. 1975).
'Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420, 583-650 (1837).
sCertainly, few cases or judges have generated more debate among American constitu-
tional and legal historians. See, e.g., M. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW.
1780-1860, at 127-39 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TRANSFORMATION]; S. KuTLER, PRIVILEGE AND
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971); Newmyer,Justice Joseph Story,
The Charles River Bridge Case and the Crisis of Republicanism, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 232
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Crisis].
4See, e.g., Crisis, supra note 3, at 232.
51d. at 245.
6See also I L. BOUDIN. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 337 (1932):
[T]he question of the "impairment of the obligation of contracts" within the
meaning of the United States Constitution [art. 1, § 10] ... is one of the most abstruse
questions in our law; but its solution . . . is not a matter of legal learning but of
political opinion .... But back of it all looms the question to which all of our political
problems ultimately gravitate-the question of the Judicial Power.
In other words the question which always presents itself to the people of this
country in such an emergency is not: What is an impairment of the obligation of a
contract?-but: Who is ultimately to decide what is an impairment of the obligation of
a contract-the people or the courts? Hence, the question ... turned into the question
of Old Court or New tourt-i.e., whether the courts have or have not the right to
declare legislation unconstitutional.
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modem Supreme Court and its critics. 7 By placing the case in this context,
this Note endeavors to prove an extreme thesis: that a plausible argument can
be made that Story's only overarching principle in the Bridge Case was the
preservation of judicial supremacy.
The argument is necessarily speculative. 8 For any number of practical
reasons,9 neither Story nor his intellectual successors on the bench ever pro-
Id. (N.b. The above quotation introduced Boudin's discussion of Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819)).
Despite his book's title and his conception of a contract clause question, Professor
Boudin-far from perceiving judicial supremacist premises in Story's Bridge dissent-simply dis-
missed the minority opinion. See notes 11 & 120 infra.7See, e.g., R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); C. KILGORE. JUDICIAL TYRANNY
(1977); L. LUSKY. BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975).
'But then so are other recent explanations of the dissent. See, e.g., Crisis, supra note 3, at
242 (express disclaimer).
Three other initial caveats are in order:
(1) It is submitted that the Bridge Case represented, in addition to a debate over the doc-
trine of separation of powers, a debate over the nature of federalism. This Note, however, con-
fines itself to a discussion of the former for that debate has been completely overlooked. The
Taney-Story debate over the nature of federalism has received only passing attention. The few
scholars who mention Taney's states' rights arguments in the Bridge Case (e.g., S. KuTLEs. supra
note 3, at 86; authorities cited in note 10 infra) miss the partisan, nationalist overtones in Story's
dissent, focusing instead on what is perceived to be Story's formalism. The present Note merely
posits the Bridge dissent's nationalist principles as an important corollary to the opinion's separa-
tion of powers argument. See also note 10 infra.
(2) Because the federal contract clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, quoted in note 21 in-
fra) plays a relatively minor role in modem constitutional law, one tends to forget that, prior to
the development of substantive economic due process, the contract clause was constantly invoked
to regulate business and overrule legislation. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 604 (9th ed. 1975). See also L. DAVIS & D. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND AMERICAN EcONOMIc GROWTH 72 (1971). At a number of levels, the Bridge dissent presages
substantive due process jurisprudence. Nevertheless, this Note does not pursue this theme except
in the most tangential fashion.
(3) Story's Bridge dissent relied upon the doctrine of public and private corporations enun-
ciated in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), and Story's concur-
rence therein. Id. at 666-713. See generally note 58 infra. That doctrine has been the subject of
innumerable articles, most recently Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story's Doctrine of "Public and
Private Corporations" and the Rise of the American Business Corporation, 25 DEPAUL L. REV.
825, 840-41 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Story's Doctrine].
For purposes of argument, this Note accepts the traditional interpretation of theorigins of
the public-private distinction and the corporation. In fact, there is increasing evidence which
suggests that the standard account is incomplete and perhaps implausible. See Hartog, Because
All the World Was Not New York City: Governance, Property Rights, and the State in the
Changing Definition of a Corporation, 1730-1860 (paper delivered to American Society for Legal
History meeting, Nov. 4, 1977, Boston, Mass.) (unpublished) (copy of ins. on file with Indiana
Law Journal).
'Not the least of these reasons is the awkwardness inherent in atempting to justify any final
arbiter of power in a democratic society. Besides, no matter how legitimate the exercise of that
power might be, any judicial attempt to insist upon its legitimacy invites the wrath of public opin-
ion-and the risk of curtailment of that power. Above all, an admission of judicial supremacy
presupposes that there is no check upon a court's power-that the judge really is supreme, and
hence, potentially lawless. See generally Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2 passim (1971). If one believes the exercise of judicial power is illegitimate
under the particular circumstances of a case, the above tactical reasons would apply a fortiori.
For some striking examples, consult Berger, Academe vs. the Founding Fathers, XXX NATIONAL
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claimed that judicial supremacy was a first principle. Certainly Story's Bridge
dissent sought to conceal this principle. Similarly, Story never admitted to
any tension between judicial supremacy and judicial objectivity. Yet it is in
the same dissent where one discovers an extraordinary collision between prin-
ciples of supremacy and objectivity. And it is Story's ultimate resolution of
this conflict which makes the case so instructive to any modern reader seeking
to unravel moral dilemmas of judicial process and substantive justice.
Heretofore, valuable lessons to be learned from the Bridge dissent have
been overlooked because the clash within the dissent has itself been overlook-
ed. For 140 years Story's war with his conscience has been obscured by
historians' preoccupation with more obvious antebellum economic and
ideological conflicts in the Bridge opinions. Indeed, precisely because Chief
Justice Taney's jurisprudence devolved into a principle of judicial
supremacy, t0 historians may have assumed that Story, Taney's foremost an-
tagonist, could not possibly have been operating from judicial supremacist
principles.' In order to suggest the incomplete nature of existing interpreta-
tions and to test the proposed thesis, this Note shall first review the historical
debate over the Bridge dissent, and then focus primarily upon one historian's
new explanation12 of the case.
THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE
In 1650 the Massachusetts legislature granted Harvard College a
perpetual franchise over the Charlestown-Boston ferry. In 1785, in response
to a citizens' petition,1S the state legislature passed a statute incorporating a
REVIEW 468, 469-71 (April 14, 1978). Compare id. with authorities cited in note 42 infra with
authorities cited in notes 64 & 65 infra with note 133 infra with authorities cited in note 139 in-fra.
'
0
"Taney substituted judicial supremacy for the principle of national supremacy." G.
GARVEY, CONSTITTYrIONAL BRICOLAGE 99 (1971) (following E. CORWIN, COMMERCE POWER V.
STATES RIGHTS 135-36 (1936) (Garvey chiefly relies on Taney's opinions for the Court in The
Charles River Bridge Case and Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837)). Com-
pare Story's very different kind of judicial supremacy which was a principle of national
supremacy-not a substitute for the latter. See notes 113-39 infra & text accompanying.
"Thus even scholars intent on finding judicial supremacist premises in every Surpeme
Court case (see note 6 supra) never found them in Story's Bridge dissent. A far simpler explana-
tion seemed to suffice:
The naivetE with which Mr. Justice Story appeals to the authority of the remnants
of the feudal law still lingering in the English Common Law as the proper constitu-
tional rule for the government of the United States is indeed tragic. Again and again
he pathetically reverts to the fact that he is placing himself squarely on a rule of law
three centuries old-little realizing that the older the rule of law the less serviceable is
it likely to be in our times.
1 L. BOUDIN, supra note 6, at 390, see id. at 388-96. But see, e.g. notes 79 & 110 infra & text
accompanying.
"Professor R. Kent Newmyer's article, Crisis, supra note 3.
"
5See 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 536 (1837). The petition "stat[ed] the inconvenience of the
transportation by ferries, over Charles [R]iver, and the public advantages that would result from
a bridge." Id.
1977-1978]
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The Charles River Bridges: 1830
The above map appears as a frontispiece in Professor Stanley L Kutler's
book, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION. Copyright © 1971 byJ.B. Lip-
pincott Company. All rights reserved. Map and title reprinted with the kind
permission of the publisher.
N. b., cf. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the War-
ren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344, 388 (1830) (map) (denoting towns, bridges,
and ferries by letters and numbers, but otherwise identical to the map reprinted
above.) affd 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
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company, the Proprietors of Charles River Bridge, for the purpose of
building a bridge across the ferry route. The charter authorized the collection
of tolls, limited its term to forty years, and required the proprietors "to pay
two hundred pounds, annually, to Harvard College . .. [as] 'reasonable an-
nual compensation, for the annual income of the ferry, which [Harvard]
might have received had not the said bridge been erected.""14 The charter
specified that "at the expiration of the forty years the bridge was to be the
property of the commonwealth." "5 But in 1792, six years after the opening of
the bridge, the legislature "for the encouragement of enterprise"' 6 extended
the charter to seventy years.' 7
In 1828, however, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Pro-
prietors of the Warren Bridge for the purpose of erecting another bridge over
the Charles,' 8 a bridge to be built directly adjacent to the Charles River
Bridge. The Warren Bridge was to be a free bridge, and its charter specified
that tolls were to be collected only until the builders were reimbursed, or for
six years, whichever occurred first.' 9
Upon the granting of the Warren Bridge charter, the Charles River
Bridge proprietors sought a preliminary injunction in state court to prevent
the building of the Warren Bridge on the ground "that the act for the erec-
141d. at 537 (quoting but not directly citing 1784 Mass. Acts, ch. 53 (March 9, 1785) ("An
Act for Incorporating Certain Persons for the purpose of Building a Bridge over Charles River,
Between Boston and Charlestown, and Supporting the Same During the Term of Forty Years"
[Charles River Bridge charter]).
136 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 537 (1837).
11791 Mass. Acts, ch. 62 (March 6, 1792) [West Boston Bridge charter]. The occasion for
the extension was the legislature's chartering of another bridge. The significance of this fact will
be developed later in the Note. At the outset, however, it is essential to demonstrate that-con-
trary to the Bridge majority-the compensatory nature of this statute was unambiguous: "And
whereas the erection of Charles River Bridge was a work of hazard and public utility, and
another bridge in the place of West Boston bridge may diminish the emoluments of Charles
River Bridge; therefore, for the encouragement of enterprise . . ." the original charter was ex-
tended. Id. quoted in 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 550 (1837).
The West Boston Bridge was "distant only between one and two miles from the old
bridge." Id. at 550. In its statement of the facts (36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 536-39), the Court had
facilely omitted reference to the West Boston Bridge charter and the rationale behind the exten-
sion of the Charles River Bridge charter. When the Court finally mentioned the West Boston
Bridge charter (id. at 550), Chief Justice Taney trivialized its significance. See id. at 550-51
(construing but not directly citing 1791 Mass. Acts, ch. 62 (March 6, 1792) [West Boston Bridge
charter]).
As a conclusion of law and matter of statutory construction, Chief Justice Taney stated,
"[F]rom the language used in the clauses of the [West Boston Bridge charter] by which the
[Charles River Bridge] charter is extended, it would seem, that the legislature was especially
careful to exclude any inference that the extension was made upon the ground of compromise
with the [Charles River] Bridge Company, or as a compensation for rights impaired." 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) at 550-51 (emphasis added); see id. at 552-53. Contra, id. 648-49 (Story, J., dissenting);
note 78 infra; see Crisis, supra note 3, at 237. (Crisis mistakenly implies that the compensatory
nature of the act incorporating West Boston Bridge charter was undisputed.)
136 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 536, 550. See note 16 supra.
11828 Mass. Acts, ch. 127 (March 12, 1828) ("An Act to Establish the Warren Bridge Cor-
poration").
"OId.; see 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 537 (1837).
1977-1978]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
tion of the Warren Bridge impaired the obligation of the contract between
the commonwealth and . . . the Charles River Bridge, "' in violation of the
contract clause.21 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied the
plaintiffs' bill for a preliminary injunction in 1829.22 In the meantime the
Warren Bridge was completed and opened. In 1830 the same court dismissed
the plaintiffs' supplementary bill for a permanent injunction and general
relief. " s
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in March, 1831, but, unable
to reach a decision, it consented, in 1833, to hear rearguments. As the case
languished on the docket, the character of the Court changed dramatically
with the deaths of Justice Johnson and Chief Justice Marshall and the resigna-
tion of Justice Duvall. 24 Before the case was reheard and decided in 1837,
President Andrew Jackson had filled five vacancies. 2
At the outset of his opinion for the Court, the new Chief Justice, Roger
B. Taney, recognized, "The questions involved in this case are of the gravest
character." 26 The constitutional issue, as the state court pleadings had in-
dicated, was whether the Warren Bridge charter impaired the charter of the
Charles River Bridge and the latter's alleged right to exclusive tolls, in viola-
tion of the contract clause.27
5036 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 537.
'
1
"No State shall... pass any... law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10. See generally B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938);
Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARv. L. REv. 852 (1944).t5 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 23 Mass. (6
Pick.) 376 (1829) affd 24 Mas. (7 Pick.) 344 (1830) affd 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).23Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7
Pick.) 344 (1830) affd 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
It is however proper to state, that it is understood that the state court was equally
divided upon the [substantive contract clause] question; and that the decree dismissing
the bill upon the ground above stated, was pronounced by a majority of the court, for
the purpose of enabling the complainants to bring the question for decision before [the
United States Supreme] Court.
Id. at 538; see id. at 420.
"Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 [1 Stat. 73, 85] provided that the Supreme Court
could take appeals only if state courts sustained state laws challenged as repugnant to the federal
constitution." S. KUTLER. supra note 3, at 45. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN. D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 439 (2d ed. 1973)
(quoting 1 Stat. 73, 85) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. See also id. 440-55.
24 See S. KUTLER. supra note 3, at 58.20See G. GUNTHER, supra note 8, app. at 2-3 (Table of Justices).
2636 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 536.
27Newymer characterizes the constitutional question slightly differently. He says the issue in
the Bridge Case "was whether the new free bridge encroached upon the allegedly exclusive toll
rights of the earlier bridge, in violation of the contract clause . . . as interpreted in Dartmouth
College v. Woodward." Crisis, supra note 3, at 232 (emphasis added). This statement of the issue
is correct as a practical matter but since Newmyer himself acknowledges that the Bridge majority
never even cited Dartmouth (ostensibly thinking it inapposite) (see id. at 237), this framing of the
issue is potentially misleading.
For discussion of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819), see note 58 infra.
[Vol. 53:327
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Since the Charles River Bridge charter was silent on the question of
monopoly rights,28 the case turned, in one sense, entirely upon statutory con-
struction. The Taney majority construed the charter narrowly and refused to
imply any exclusive franchise, thus the new charter did not impair the old
contract. 29 Upholding the right of the legislature to charter the Warren
Bridge, the Chief Justice "argu[ed] that the charter issued by the legislature
to the old bridge was analogous to a royal grant, which he reasoned from the
common law must always be interpreted in favor of the king and against the
grantee in doubtful cases."3 0
In a 57 page dissent rejecting the royal grant analogy,31 Justice Story,
joined by Justice Thompson, construed the Charles River Bridge charter
liberally, found an implied exclusive franchise, and thus held the new War-
ren Bridge charter unconstitutionally impaired the old bridge's charter.
HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER STORY'S BRIDGE DISSENT
Distinguished historians still romantically teach undergraduates that the
Charles River Bridge Court heroically defended the people against the op-
pression of monopoly. 2 Others have characterized and defended the minority
281784 Mass. Acts, ch. 53 (March 9, 1785); accord, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 587 (1837)
(Story, J., dissenting); S. KUTLER. supra note 3, at 96-97; cf Story's Doctrine, supra note 8, at
840-41 (charter's wording was "imprecise"). Contra, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 609 (Story, J., dissen-
ting). Compare id. with id. at 587.
236 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 536-53.
Justice McLean concurred on the affirmance of dismissal of the plaintiffs' bill on the
grounds the United States Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. Had he reached the merits, he em-
phasized he would have found an impairment of the Charles River Bridge Company's charter,
and held the Warren Bridge's charter unconstitutional, as construed (by Story). See 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) at 554-83 (McLean, J., concurring). See also note 82 infra.
3"Story's Doctrine, supra note 8, at 840.
"Story's common law justifications for his liberal construction, and the distinctions among
royal grants, royal grants for consideration, and mere legislative grants are elaborated in the dis-
sent and faithfully abridged in Crisis, supra note 3. See notes 58, 59, 98, 106 infra & text accom-
panying; cf. S. KuTLER. supra note 3, at 97 (recognizes the distinction between outright royal
grants and royal grants for consideration, but apparently misses Story's crucial distinction bet-
ween royal grants (of all kinds) and legislative grants).
32[The Charles River Court] held that the rights of corporations are subordinate to the
interests of the community- "that the community also have rights, and the happiness
and well being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation." The Court thus
provided an admirable statement of several of the basic goals of Jacksonian
Democracy: encouragement of new entrepreneurs, an attack on special privilege and
entrenched "monopoly;" and the promotion of the happiness and welfare of all the
people.
J. BLUM, B. CATION. E. MORGAN. A. SCHLESINGER. K. STAMPP, C. V. WOODWARD. THE NATIONAL
EXPERIENCE 245 (2nd ed. 1968); cf. id. at 227-28 (4th ed. 1977) (omitting the last "goal" in the
excerpt above).
The problem with this analysis is not that it is incorrect, but that it insidiously invites the
negative inference that the dissenters opposed economic growth, and for that matter, the hap-
piness of the people. "To argue that Story was concerned solely with protecting the interests of
the 'privileged few,' is a specious argument. . . . Such a dark view of Story reveals a
misunderstanding of the ethical issues of the case itself." McClellan, [Comment], Comments on
1977-1978]
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opinion as inspired and compelled by natural law."3 But legal historians who
admire the case have in the past few years offered an engaging economic ra-
tionale which now constitutes an orthodox view to explain both the majority
and the dissent. Professor Kutler, the foremost proponent of this economic in-
terpretation, captures the theme in his book's title, Privilege and Creative
Destruction. 3
4
Kutler et al believe that Taney and Story were in fundamental agreement
over the virtues of capitalism and the business corporation. Both believed
economic growth was desirable; both believed law could and should facilitate
that growth.
The Chief Justice and Story differed, says Kutler, only over
macroeconomic strategy. The Taney majority, by refusing to infer monopoly
privileges in preexisting charters, lowered all barriers to entry to new com-
petition. Story, on the other hand, convinced that the old bridge (like hun-
dreds of other bridges, ferries, turnpikes, and canals) would never have been
built without implicit assurances of freedom from competition, believed that
investors, in search of capital preservation and appreciation, relied on these
implicit exclusive franchises and needed, above all, certainty in the construc-
tion of legislative charters. If the public wanted another bridge, said Story,
let the legislature condemn the first and pay just compensation. Alternatively,
if the public wished to avoid exclusive franchises, the legislature could ex-
pressly disavow any intention of exclusivity in the original charter.
By laying "the unavoidable social costs of economic growth upon static
capital,"35 Taney decided upon an instrumentalist, Jacksonian policy of
"creative destruction." By contrast, says Kutler, Story's anachronistic,
blackletter dissent was obsessed with saving vested property rights.
However useful Kutler's economic argument may be as a partial explana-
tion,36 it obscures larger themes of political theory in the Bridge case. For ex-
Kent Newmyer's Paper, [Crisis, supra note 3], 17 Am.J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 272 (1973); cf. 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) at 606-07 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting) (insisting this was not a monopoly case in any
event).
"
5J. MCCLELLAN. JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1971); McClellan, [Com-
ment], supra note 32, at 272 (quoting Anon. [Joseph Story], Natural Law, IX ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA 150-58 (F. Lieber ed.) (new ed. 1836), reprinted in J. McCLELLAN, 313 app. I
(313-24)). But see Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal
History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275 passim, esp. 284-85, 292 (1973) (review of G. DUNNE. note
100 infra, and J. MCCLELLAN); cf L. STRAUSS. NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953) (arguing
that natural law as a philosophy has no true adherents after 1776 and the Declaration of In-
dependence). See also Treating People as Equals, TIME. September 5, 1977, at 54 (review of R.
DWORKIN, infra note 118).
34S. KUTLER. supra note 3, esp. 4-5, 93-101; accord, TRANSFORMATION. supra note 3, at
127-39; Horwitz, The Legacy of 1776 in Legal and Economic Thought, 19 J. OF LAW AND ECON.
627, 631-32 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Legacy of 1776].
35 Crisis, supra note 3, at 232 (paraphrasing Kutler).
"
6Even as an economic interpretation it has been criticized as incomplete. First, "the
original Charles River Bridge was built with venture capital, and it is difficult to understand how
a decision which in effect confiscates property built by venture capital can be interpreted as an
encouragement to entrepreneurs." M.M.M., Book Review, 24 ALA. L. REv. 249, 252 (1971); see
(Vol. 53:327
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ample, the orthodox interpretation simply cannot explain the intensity and
reality of the conflict provoked by the Bridge decision. Daniel Webster, losing
counsel for appellant-Charles River Bridge, quickly discerned that his
Presidential aspirations would remain only aspirations.3 7 Crestfallen by the
result, Justice Story considered resigning,38 but took solace that at least some
lawyers had seen that more than economics was involved. Chancellor Kent
shared his private thoughts with Story:
I have just now finished a studied perusal of the [11th] volume of Peters
Reports and I cannot avoid venting my grief and mortification in confidence
to you. It appears to me that the Court has fallen from its high station and
commanding dignity, and has lost its energy, and spirit, and independence,
and accuracy, and surrendered up to the temper of the day, the true prin-
ciples of the Constitution."9
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 608 (Story, J., dissenting). See also Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery
Movement Upon Styles ofJudicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 513,
518-19, 523 (1974) reprinted in ESSAYS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 146,
151-52, 156 (W. Holt ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as ESSAYS].
Second, the practical effect of Taney's holding-far from lowering barriers to entry-raised
them, for investors simply demanded and received express exclusive charters. Kutler recognizes as
much (S. KUTLER, supra note 3, at 94) but does not reconcile this consequence with his creative
destruction thesis. See 24 ALA. L. REV. at 252. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 175-76 (1973).
Query whether the first criticism is legitimate. Does it not beg the issue, viz. whether the
plaintiffs had a vested property right to exclusive tolls? Besides, one man's venture capital is
another man's static capital. What Story and M.M.M. considered the former, Taney and Kutler
considered the latter. Finally, the venture capital aspect of the plaintiffs' case only went to the
question of reliance and intent of the parties under the Charles River Bridge charter. In constru-
ing this statute, Story paid lip service to a will theory of contract, but it was not his dispositive
test. See note 79 infra. This Note, in fact, argues that Story suspected that Taney's economic
strategy for growth was indeed more workable than his own. See note 75 infra.
"See C. SWISHER. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY
PERIOD. 1836-1864, at 92 (1974) (Holmes Devise vol. 5). See also 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 514n.*
(Reporters note); C. SWISHER at 92 passim.
38J. MCCLELLAN, supra note 33, at 224 (citations omitted).
To his wife, Story wrote, "A case of grosser injustice, or more oppressive legislation, never
existed. I feel humiliated, as I think every one here is, by the Act [Warren Bridge charter] which
has now been confirmed." (February 14, 1837), reprinted in 2 LETTERs, infra note 39, at 268 quoted
inJ. MCCLELLAN 225 n.125.
5 James Kent to Joseph Story (June 23, 1837), quoted in C. SWISHlE, supra note 37, at 92 &
n.77 (citatiohs omitted); J. HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM, 1763-1847, at
293-94 (1939 rpt. 1969).
In the same letter, Kent added, "I abhor the [Taney] doctrine that the legislature is not
bound by everything that is necessarily implied in a contract, in order to give it effect and value,
and by nothing that is not expressed in haec verba, that one rule of interpretation is to be ap-
plied to their engagements, and another rule to the contracts of individuals." Quoted in C.
SWISHER, at 92; see Charles Sumner to Joseph Story (March 25, 1837), reprinted in 2 LIFE AND LET-
TERS OF JOSEPH STORY 270 (W. W. Story, ed. 1850) [hereinafter cited as LETTERS], quoted in C.
SWISHER, at 92 n.84; [James Kent], Supreme Court of the United States, 2 N.Y.L. REV. 372, 390
(1838), quoted in C. SWISHER at 95 & n.96. Compare id. ("What a deep injury has this [Bridge] deci-
sion inflicted on the Constitution, jurisprudence, and character of the United Statesl We are fast
sinking even below the standard of Pagan antiquity.") and Crisis, supra note 3, at 243 (citation omit-
ted) (Story "argued strenuously that Christianity was a part of the common law .. ") with
Bozell, The Unwritten Constitution, in AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 52, 55 (W.F. Buckley, Jr. ed. 1970) ("The 'obligation of contracts' clause ... says a lot
1977-1978]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
[The Bridge decision] abandons, or overthrows, a great principle of con-
stitutional morality, and I think goes to destroy the security and value of
legislative franchises. It injures the moral sense of the community, and
destroys the sanctity of contracts. If the legislature can quibble away, or
whittle away its contracts with impunity, the people will be sure to follow....
But I had the consolation, in reading the case, to know that you have vin-
dicated the principles . . . of the old law, with your accustomed learning,
vigor, and warmth, and force. 40
Recently, Professor Newmyer, a constitutional historian, rediscovered
these larger themes in Story's dissent. "The problem," Newmyer contends, "is
to avoid anachronism, to take Story seriously, to reread his opinion with an
open mind and to see the Bridge Case as he saw it-as part of a desperate
struggle for the preservation of Republican society itself."41 Newmyer asks us,
therefore, to recall the philosophical underpinnings of Republicanism:
The original and fundamental principle of Republican political theory
was sovereignty of the people, but what the Framers gave to the people with
one hand they took back with the other, for the corollary to popular
sovereignty was the axiom that law, not men, governed. The American peo-
ple were sovereign but they could speak in their sovereign capacity only in
organic convention and had spoken only in their Constitution. Beneath this
supreme law, permeating and informing it, was the common law, which the
newly-constituted states made the foundation of their respective jurisdictions.
Law, then, and the system of courts designed to administer and maintain it,
provided the basic framework of public and private action-one designed,
first, to maximize the individual energies unleashed by the Revolution (and
both the Constitution and the common law took on this promotive function),
and second, to prevent the abuse of public power by both the magistrates
and the people. 42
Newmyer's "revisionist" interpretation recognizes that Story, Kent,
Webster, and their fellow Whigs embraced these principles. Story perceived
in the Bridge Case the final assault upon the citadel of Republicanism: "The
basic Republican principle that the sovereign people spoke only in constitu-
tional convention was forgotten as the new breed of professional politicians
about what we now call the Protestant ethic, and has played no small role in causing its obser-
vance in American public life.")
40James Kent to Joseph Story (June 23, 1837), reprinted in 2 LETTERS, supra note 39, at
270, quoted in J. MCCLELLAN, supra note 33, at 216; accord, C. SWISHER, supra note 37, at 92.
In an earlier letter "Kent wrote to Justice Story that he had read the opinion of the Chief
Justice in the Bridge Case and dropped it in disgust. By contrast he referred to Story's 'masterly
and exhausting argument.' Later he reread the opinion of the Court 'with increased disgust.'
Id. (citations omitted).
But cf. TRANSFORMATION. supra note 3, at 139 ("No longer [viz., "by the time the . . .
Bridge case was decided"] did Kent write of the need to provide legal guarantees to encourage
the investment of private capital.").41Crisis, supra note 3, at 233.
4'Id. at 234 & n.4 (following G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969)). See
also note 65 infra.
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claimed sovereignty for themselves by virtue of their election. Republicanism
succumbed to democracy, law to politics.' 4 To Story then, Charles River
Bridge offered the Court its last chance to "bring the people back to their
Republican senses and restore the system of law which kept republican
citizens moral and virtuous." 4 4 The Court declined the invitation. Taney's
holding represented, to Story, the culmination
of an unmistakable pattern of disaster, which included the resurgence of
political parties, the election of Andrew Jackson, the rise of states' rights and
nullification, the defeat of the Cherokees, the destruction of the Second Bank
of the United States and national economic planning, the movement for
codification of the common law, the death of Marshall and the emergence of
the Jacksonian Court.4 5
Newmyer concludes, "What Story wanted to achieve through law was not just
economic expansion, as some historians have assumed, but economic expan-
sion and the preservation of Republican morality. Indeed, in his dire forecast
about the effect of Taney's opinion, he went the final step to argue that only
with such morality could progress be achieved." 4 6
Newmyer's goal is to demonstrate that "[t]he power struggle which Story
saw . . . was between law and politics-a struggle which originated in the
ambiguities and tensions within Republicanism itself.' 47 But his argument
begins with a consideration of Story's "formula for a moral economic
growth. "48
The two classic arguments against Story's formula for contractual morali-
ty have always been (1) that it worked only to the advantage of the corpora-
tion (to the disadvantage of the legislature) and (2) that that formula could
only retard, never promote, economic growth.4" To rebut the first contention,
Newmyer marshals three cases in which Story, writing for the Court, created
law in order to impose new duties on corporations."0 In refutation of the se-
4sOrj , supra note 3, at 235.
4"Id.
41d. at 233-34.
6Id. at 239. It is irrelevant to Newmyer and this Note that "history disproved Story's pro-
position that contractual morality as he laid it out in his dissent was the sine qua non of cor-
porate expansion." Id. But cf. Dunne, Justice Story and the Modem Corporation-A Closing
Circle?, 17 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 262 (1973) (arguing that Story's contractual morality may be find-
ing new expression in recent cases involving fiduciaries, etc.).
"Crisis, supra note 3, at 234.
4'8"[I.]e., economic expansion that would not undercut the basic principles of private con-
tract." Id at 239.
49See id. at 239-40.
"Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Administrator, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 299 (1813) ("[C]or-
porations liable for contracts not under corporate seal made by their authorized agents." Crisis,
supra note 3, at 240.); Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64 (1827)
(Same principle extended to contracts executed by bank cashiers. See Crisis, at 240.); Mumma v.
The Potomac Company, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 281 (1834) ("[C]orporation's contract survives its
dissolution and . . . the capital stock of dissolved corporations becomes a trust fund for the
satisfaction of debts against the corporation." Crisis at 240).
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cond criticism, viz., "that Story's dissent would not have worked at all-that
it would have forestalled corporate expansion by fortifying existing corpora-
tions with monopoly protections," Newmyer essentially repeats at least four of
Story's arguments which prove that the dissent did not "preclude donsiderable
economic advancement." ' On the, basis of this evidence, Newmyer concludes
that Story's modem economic critics have failed to establish the inefficacy of
Story's economic philosophy: "[T]he idea that Story saw and provided for
controlled economic growth is certainly consistent with the promotive thrust
of his entire legal system. '5 2
Having identified one of Story's goals, economic growth (and the viability
of Story's strategy for its achievement), Newmyer then argues that Story had
another goal: the preservation of Republican morality. It is essential that
Newmyer prove each half of his dual thesis.
What did Republican morality presuppose of a constitutional decision?
The, answer for both Newmyer and Story is and was simple: judicial objectivi-
ty. And Newmyer, mirroring and reconstructing Story's beliefs, sees in the
Charles River majority opinion the surrender of judicial objectivity. The
result, for Story, was catastrophic because the Court abandoned rationality in
favor of judicial subjectivism:5 3 "Without scholarship and legal science,
political opinion would take over."" 4 In a single decision, argues Newmyer,
Chief Justice Taney overthrew Story's "rational system of scientific inquiry"55
and "struggle for objectivity" 6  as preeminently exemplified in Story's
"delicately balanced system."6 7 Taney's approach was irreconcilable with Mar-
51Crisis, supra note 3, at 241. "First, an implied grant of exclusive rights, even if successful-
ly claimed, would last only for the period of time set by legislative discretion." Id. Second (as the
discussion of the consensual interpretation indicated), the legislature could always by express
reservation bar implied exclusive franchises-a la Story's concurrence in The Dartmouth College
Case, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 666-713 (1819), discussed in notes 58 & 133 infra; see Crisis,
supra note 3, at 240-41. Third, "[W~hether existing bridges could claim monopoly rights against
new bridges depended on the extent to which a second bridge damaged the revenue of existing
bridges, which was necessarily a question of degree-a question, in short, for future courts to
decide on new facts." Id. Fourth, "future courts could distinguish between a canal and a railroad
in such matters as function ad termini, and Story's contention about the limited scope of the
Bridge ruling would invite them to do so." Id. (citations omitted). (A fifth argument, which
Newmyer apparently does not advance, was the availability of eminent domain should the public
require a free bridge.)
12Id. at 242.
15"[T]he result was disastrous, for by abandoning the rational system of scientific inquiry
and the struggle for objectivity, the Court launched itself on a turbulent sea of judicial subjec-
tivism." Id. at 243-44.
11id. at 244.
11Id. at 243.
"1Id. at 244.
1Id. at 245; accord, id. at 242 ("Story's dissent reveals much about his system of law and
about the role he designed for the Court (which follows logically from his system)."):
The law which Story fashioned to save the Republic from the onslaught of democracy
in the Bridge dissent was neither moral and idealistic, scientific and rational, nor
pragmatic and instrumental-it was allU of these together. And it was ... the same in-
gredients fashioned in the same organic manner that constitute Story's larger system of
law... .
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shall's analysis in The Dartmouth College Case.58 Reconstructing Story's
thoughts, Newymer reasons, "It was a matter of scholarship. That Taney
should misread the authorities on royal grants was one thing, but not to con-
sult them was another, and to misconstrue the entire legal framework of the
case was even worse. Taney was either cynical or incompetent." s For
Newmyer, then, Story's dissent rested on a "crisis" in Republican morality,
based on Story's failed struggle to keep law and politics divorced:
If Republican law was so complex and so delicate, and if legal science was so
demanding, it followed that lawyers and judges, not professional politicians
and legislators, should be entrusted with the main duty of law-keeping and
law-making. And herein lay Story's final argument with Taney in the Bridge
Case, for the Chief Justice conceded too much authority to the legislature
and professional politicians who then ruled there. By arguing that there was
some principle of public welfare beyond the operation of the buyer-seller con-
Certainly no lawyer of the age save Kent was so committed to making law
technically, scientifcally pure .... And for all his respect for inherited principles, he
never hesitated to depart from or go beyond them if practical necessity required- as in
his conception of public and private corporations .... It was this very same practical,
creative legal scientist who argued strenuously that Christianity was a part of the com-
mon law, who, of all judges of the period, revered and retained natural law notions of
the eternal, unchanging and moral principles of jurisprudence.
Story's system of law ...was organic and synthetic like the culture it hoped to
conserve-that is to say, it reached out to integrate politics, economics and other
aspects of society into a harmonious and moral community.
Story's undertaking was conservative in the largest sense. . . .But it does not
follow that his legal system was static or retrogressive. Natural law assumptions of the
eighteenth century permeated his legal thinking, to be sure, but he harmonized them,
as Blackstone did earlier, with rational, systematic legal science. And to this fusion of
morality and science he added a pragmatic instrumentalism quite alien to the eighteenth
century common law-a pragmatism which was designed to bring law into harmony
with the unique demands of American history ...
Id. at 242-44 (emphasis added). But see notes 101-12 infra & text accompanying.
5 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 666-713 (Story, J.,
concurring) (1819).
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall held that a charter is a contract, protected by
the contract clause, and held (implicitly) that a mere state legislature would be treated as an in-
dividual in its dealing with corporations (i.e., according to private law). See Cris, supra note 3,
at 237, 240; cf. H. FRIENDLY. The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private Penumbra,
12 TEx. Q. (1969) (Supp. 2), reprinted in THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PENUMBRA 9 (1969) ("[lIt was also necessary [in addition to holding that a charter is a
contract] to determine whether Dartmouth was a public or a private institution, since if it were
the former, the legislature would have been free to act as it willed."). Compare id. with notes
96-99 infra & text accompanying. In his concurrence, Justice Story proposed a solution (described
in note 51 supra) which was immediately adopted by many state courts. Story emphasized that
his rule was applicable only to future charters a state might grant, not to charters already ex-
ecuted. As for these latter, Story intended to hold legislatures bound, as his Bridge dissent at-
tests.
The best short discussion of the case is Story's Doctrine, supra note 8. See F. STITES.
PRIVATE INTEREST AND PUBLIC GAIN: THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE. 1819 (1971); Kutler, Book
Review, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 396 (1973) (review of F. STrrEs). See also note 133 infra.
59Crisis, supra note 3, at 243; accord, id. at 235-38. See generally note 98 infra.
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tractual process and by conceding that the legislature had some special
prerogative to voice that principle, Taney came dangerously close to the
ultimate democratic herey-the very one presumably stamped out by
Republican constitutional theory-that the legislature itself and not the peo-
ple was sovereign. 60
What are the consequences of the revisionist approach? By positing the
Bridge Case in the context of an ideological argument, Newmyer has
transformed the terms and directions of the historiographical controversy.
Not simply an argument over the means necessary to bring about an end in
which all might believe (e.g., economic growth), the Bridge Case stands as an
apotheosis of a conflict over the nature of Republican society. Yet, when one
returns to Story's dissent, one is struck by the indirection of its argumentative
structure. Perhaps this "defect" should be ascribed to the obligatory,
technical language of the case. Nonetheless, by accepting all of Story's
arguments sequentially and at face value, and then reporting them as
historical truths, Newmyer's revisionist interpretation cannot help but miss
some very basic questions. It is a generous reading of the dissent which raises
for Newmyer the question of Republican morality. But it is that generous
reading of the dissent which also prevents Newmyer from exhausting the
possibilities in a Republican interpretation. As a consequence, Newmyer, no
less than his predecessors, overlooks Story's implicit and idiosyncratic defini-
tion of Republicanism and cannot appreciate the peculiar ramifications of
that definition in The Charles River Bridge Case.
JUSTICE STORY CONFRONTS "THE PURE INTERPRETIVE MODEL":
JUDICIAL OBJECTIVITY, REPUBLICAN THEORY, AND NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Newmyer's simple dichotomies between Story's Republicanism and
Taney's Jacksonianism exaggerate some ideological and cultural differences,
and more importantly, leave unaddressed the most fundamental tensions
within Story's dissent. Professor Newmyer asks only whether Story's
jurisprudence, as revealed in his Bridge dissent, was consistent with the goal
of the preservation of Republican society. No one appears, however, to have
asked the distinctly different and altogether indispensable question: Was
Story's jurisprudence (again, as revealed in his Bridge dissent) consistent with
Republican morality itself? At a minimum the answer to this question will
show that a simplistic view of the Bridge dissent cannot begin to unravel the
severe conflicts within Story's private cosmology. Furthermore, the inquiry
60 d. at 243 (emphasis added); see 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 598-604, 621-47, esp. 644, 647
(Story, J., dissenting); Legacy of 1776, supra note 34, at 623 passim. See generally G. GUNTHER.
supra note 8, at 16-20, esp. 17 n. t.
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may begin to uncover in the dissent Story's secret hierarchy of Republican
values.
At the core of traditional Republican theory must lie the principle of
judicial objectivity for how else could one hope to justify the corollary princi-
ple, the divorce of law and politics?61 But in spite of Newmyer's graphic
depiction of Story as a paragon of judicial objectivity,6 2 the Bridge dissent
reveals, in spite of itself, a very different portrait.
If Story's opinion really reflected a struggle to maintain judicial objectivi-
ty and Republican morality against the onslaught of Taney's cynical subjec-
tivism and dubious scholarship, there must be a way to confirm the assertion.
One approach might be to ask whether the opinion comports with some ser-
viceable notion of "neutral principles"68 of "neutral derivation."'6' By testing
Story's dissent against a "pure interpretive model, '"6 5 one can show (1) that
61Legacy of 1776, supra note 34, at 623 passim; Crisis, supra note 3, at 271 passim; accord,
Bork, supra note 9 at 2 passim, esp. 8 (citing A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS 96 (1970)); Dewey, James Madison Helps Clio Interpret the Constitution, 15 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 38 (1971); see Holland, American Liberalism and Judicial Activism: Alexander
Bickel's Appeal from the New to the Old, 51 IND. L.J. 1025 (1976). But cf. Wright, Professor
Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1971) (rejecting
judicial objectivity).
62See notes 53-57, 59 supra & text accompanying.
"
5See H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 3, 27 (1961), cited in Bork, supra note 9, at 2.
The term "neutral principles" is slightly misleading, because "any legal principle to be ap-
plied is itself never neutral because it embodies a choice of one value rather than another." Id. at
2 (following H. WECHS.ER). By "neutral principles," constitutional scholars mean simply:
the neutral application of principles, which is a requirement . . . that the judge
"sincerely believe in the principle upon which he purports to rest his decision." "The
judge must believe in the validity of the reasons given in the decision at least in the
sense that he is prepared to apply them to a later case which he cannot honestly
distinguish." He must not, that is, decide lawlessly.
Bork at 2 (quoting L. JAFFE. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWMAKERS 38 (1969)) (emphasis
added). But see Wright, supra note 61, criticized in Bork.
The most sophisticated critique of Wechsler's neutral principles approach remains Deutsch,
Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political
Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968) (recommends contextual approach); see Deutsch, Prece-
dent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553 (1974).
"
4The "neutral derivation" principle requires a judge to apply only values which have their
source in "the text and history [of the Constitution], and their fair implications, and not con-
struct new rights." Bork, supra note 9, at 8; accord, Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof." A Com-
ment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1972); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist
tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 254 (1972) quoted in Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitu-
tion?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 704 (1975). But see Grey.
Professor Ely recently abandoned his affiliation with the neutral derivation principle. Harris
Lecture, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington) (February 7, 1978). See Ely, Constitu-
tional Interpretivism: The Allure and the Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. [forthcoming].
"Together, the complementary tests of "neutral principle" and "neutral derivation" con-
stitute the "pure interpretive model"-so named by Grey, supra note 64, at 703 (analogizing
Bork's thesis to the late Justice Hugo Black's view).
Far from being a new test, the "pure interpretive model" merely overtly rephrases the
Framers' Republican premises:
The requirement that the Court be principled arises from the resolution of the
seeming anomaly ofjudicial supremacy in a democratic society. If the judiciary really
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Story's elaborate "formula for a moral economic growth"66 cannot be explain-
ed, let alone defended, on economic grounds,6 7 (2) that this formula worked
only against the legislature and not the corporation,6 8 (3) that Story's scholar-
ship in the Bridge dissent was at least as disingenuous as Taney's scholarship
in the majority opinion,6 9 (4) that Story could be as instrumental and par-
tisan (i.e., non-neutral) as Taney in a contract clause case. 70
In the analysis that follows at least one part of the revisionist interpreta-
tion will survive intact: "What Story wanted to achieve through law was . . .
economic expansion and the preservation of Republican morality."7' What if,
however, it occurred to the Justice in 1837 that the goals of economic expan-
sion and the preservation of Republican morality were mutually exclusive?72
is supreme, able to rule when and as it seems fit, the society is not democratic. The
anomaly is dissipated, however, by the model of government embodied in the structure
of the Constitution, a model upon which popular consent to limited government by the
Supreme Court also rests. This model we may for convenience, though perhaps not
with total accuracy, call "Madisonian."
Bork, supra note 9, at 2 passim (emphasis added) (arguing that both tests are constitutionally
compelled).
Because Newmyer repeatedly argues that Story was defending Republican theory (see notes
41-44 supra & text accompanying) and because Chancellor Kent applauded Story's defense of
Republicanism, purists should have no objection to testing the 1837 Bridge dissent against the
"pure interpretive model" of the 1970's. Indeed, the "model" represents the ideal means by which
to test the objectivity of any judge whose entire argument seeks to distinguish "between royal
grants and legislative grants under our republican form of government .... [because t]here is no
provision of the [C]onstitution authorizing their [legislative] grants to be construed differently
from the grants of private persons, in regard to the like subject matter." 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 602
(Story, J., dissenting); see id. at 598, 601, 605, 606, 647.
Morever, Justice Story would presumably welcome this inquiry into his Republican objec-
tivity:
[Even i]f there were no authority in favour of so reasonable a doctrine [that legislatures
be treated according to private law in construing their grants], I would say, in the
language of the late lamented Mr. Chief Justice Parker [of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court], in this very case: "I ground it on the principle of our government and
constitution, and on the immutable principles of justice: which ought to bind govern-
ments, as well as people."
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 617 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting) (quoting but not directly citing 24 Mass. (7
Pick.) 344, (506), 522 (1830) (Parker, C. J., dissenting), affd 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837)
(Parker's quotation taken out of context). N. b.-Parker's January 12, 1830 dissent (supra) must
not be confused with his June 16, 1829 opinion for the court in the same case in the same report.
See 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344, 366 (1830). See also S. KUTLER. supra note 3, at 48-50 (discussion of
Parker's peculiar holding in state court).
16Crisis, supra note 3, at 243, quoted in text and defined in accompanying note 48 supra.
'
7 Contra, Crisis, supra note 3, at 243 passim; see notes 49-52 supra & text accompanying.
"Contra, Crisis, supra note 3, at 240; see notes 49 & 50 supra & text accompanying.
"9Contra, Crisis, supra note 3, at 243; see note 59 supra & text accompanying.
"Contra, Crisis, supra note 3, at 244; see Nelson, supra note 36, at 518-19, reprinted in
ESSAYS, supra note 36, at 151-52, 156; notes 53-57, esp. note 57 supra and text accompanying.
"Crisis, supra note 3, at 239 (emphasis added) (original emphasis at "and" omitted) quoted
in text supra (accompanying note 46). It has taken almost a century-and-a-half for historians to
concede as much. Yet how little it tells usl One could quite accurately add that Story sincerely
wanted to be an objective judge who would write straightforward, and yes, scholarly opinions.
72But see Crisis, supra note 3, at 239 (arguing that Story believed the twin aims were
mutually inclusive): "Indeed, in his dire forecast about the effect of Taney's opinion, he went the
final step to argue that only with such morality could progress be achieved." Id. (citing no
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In other words, did Story himself truly believe that controlled, Republican,
moral economic growth was possible?73 Worse, what if Story discovered that
certain principles within Republicanism itself were mutually exclusive?
These and other questions raised earlier reflect this Note's fundamental
objections to prior interpretations. By studying the dissent in terms of the
clash between Taney and Story over economic and/or ideological values, legal
historians have missed Story's private struggle with competing values. Story
was preeminently interested in preserving Republicanism, if necessary at the
cost of expansionism; if possible, with growth as a complementary conse-
quence of Republicanism; in any event, with growth as a mere incidence of
Republicanism. 74
As a practical matter, one could hardly expect Story to endorse economic
stagnation. Perhaps intuitively, Story suspected that meaningful growth was
incompatible with moral Republicanism (in much the same fashion that in-
vestment strategies which focus on growth are incompatible with strategies of
preservation of capital), and he was prepared to sacrifice the former for the
authority), quoted in text supra (accompanying note 46). Compare id. with 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at
608 (Story, J., dissenting) (predicting economic catastrophe).
"See also Legacy of 1776, supra note 34, 621, 623 passim.
In fact, it is an inconsistency in Crisis, supra note 3, which originally prompted the ques-
tion in the text. Reconsider the economic half of Newmyer's dual thesis, viz., Story wanted
economic expansion and Republicanism. It matters not that the nation endured and capitalism
prevailed without adopting Story's "contractual morality." See also note 46 supra. Legal history
has been concerned more properly with the rationale and motives behind Story's formula for
moral economic growth, and as seen earlier, it is in defense of that formula to which Newmyer
rallies. However, in disposing of the formula's critics' two classic arguments, Newmyer is impelled
to make a rather extraordinary concession: "It cannot be denied that Story's ruling would have
worked to slow down and restrain corporate growth; and in a real sense that was his intention."
Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
If this is so, why then does Newmyer go to such great lengths, echoing Story's apologia, to
prove that nonetheless, "it does not follow that his dissent precluded considerable economic ad-
vancement"? Id. Of what relevance is that assurance (or historical accident?) to the question of
Story's intention? If one points a gun at a person with the purpose of killing him, and the gun
misfires, "it does not follow that" the assailant's conduct precludes the intended victim's con-
tinued existence on the planet-but that is irrelevant (or at least should be irrelevant) to the
question of culpability. If then, "in a real sense" Story intended to "forestall corporate expan-
sion" and "slow down and restrain economic growth," how can Newymer reconcile this with the
first part of his dual conclusion, viz., that Story "wanted to achieve through law . . . economic
expansion"? Id. at 242.
74ndeed, a charitable reading of Crisis, supra note 3, might indicate that this is all
Newmyer intends by his use of the term, "controlled economic growth" and his definition of
"moral economic growth." (See note 48 supra & text accompanying). But to ascribe this insight
to Newmyer is to render inexplicable his exertions to prove the highly promotive impact of Story's
system. Curiously, Newmyer at one point reserves "the question of workability" of Story's formula
(Crisis at 242), but utterly fails to ask the question in the text.
Since Newmyer recognizes that a central tenet of the economic school states that Story's
scheme "would have forestalled corporate expansion," how can Newymer pretend to refute this
contention after conceding that "in a real sense that was [Story's] intention?" To rescue the
economic half of his thesis, Newmyer is reduced to arguing, in effect, if not in terms, that Story's
formula would have worked notwithstanding Story's intentions.
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latter, without admitting as much.76 And perhaps in 1837, or even 1831,
when the Supreme Court first heard arguments for The Charles River Bridge
Case, Story discovered that a formula for growth within a Republican social
order would not work. And perhaps he realized that Taney's economics, if
not his judicial principles, were sound.76 Whatever, Story did have a choice.
On the one hand, he could join in Taney's "creative destruction" and free
dynamic capital around the country-at the double cost of acquiescing in the
legislature's claims of sovereignty and destroying the value of hundreds of ex-
isting franchises. Or he could adhere to the Framers' Republicanism, hold the
attempted legislative incursions unconstitutional, and incidentally protect the
reliance interests of investors in preexisting corporations-at the cost of mean-
"In no sense, however, does this observation require one to accede to the revisionist conces-
sion (discussed in note 73 supra). There is no evidence to suggest that Story wished to "restrain
economic growth."
76To establish the plausibility of this suggested scenario, reconsider more skeptically the
elements of Story's economic formula and the claims made on behalf of its viability and fairness.
To assuage any doubts about the efficacy of Story's first plank (viz., that "implied grant[s]
of exclusive rights, even if successfully claimed would last only for the period of time set by
legislative discretion."), Newmyer demonstrates, "[f]or example, [that] the Charles River Bridge
would have reverted to the state in 1855." Crisis, supra note 3, at 241. Since the new bridge, the
Warren Bridge, was incorporated in 1828, had Story prevailed and permanent injunction been
granted, Boston and Charlestown would have waited 27 years for a second bridge. See notes 18 &
32 supra & text accompanying. Who knows how much earlier a second bridge might have been
incorporated but for Charles River Bridge's inveterate claims of exclusivity? The Massachusetts
and United States Supreme Court majority opinions in the Bridge Case emphasized the potential
economic stagnation such a delay would have heralded-in Boston and transportation routes
around the country. And latter day historians have consistently corroborated Taney's economic
concern as well founded. See, e.g., S. KUTLER. supra note 3, TRANSFORMATION. supra note 3, at
127-39; Legacy of 1776, supra note 34, at 631-32. See generally L. DAVIS & D. NORTH, supra
note 8, at 72-73, 137 n.1, 254-57 (1971).
As for Story's proposition that legislatures could always insert express reservations in cor-
porate charters to prevent implied exclusive franchises, even the revisionist interpretation admits
this prophylactic device was only available to future charters. Crisis, supra note 3, at 241. In
other words, the hundreds of existing bridge, canal, ferry, toll road, and nascent railroad
charters, under Story's model, would have remained exempt and protected by the contract
clause. The inadequacy of these particular recommendations, in the context of economic efficien-
cy and expansionism, has been recognized for almost half a century. See Boudin, John Marshall
and Roger B. Taney, 24 GEo. L.J. 864, 891-93 (1936).
More subtle is another proposition offered to support the feasibility of Story's formula.
Newymer makes much of the argument that, had Story prevailed, damages to old bridges with
exclusive rights by new bridges would always turn on "questions of degree-a question, in short,
for future courts to decide on new facts." Crisis, supra note 3, at 241. In other words, a
pragmatic Court could incrementally narrow the scope of damages, in order to encourage com-
petition. Curiously, this suggestion is at odds with the private contract law Story ostensibly wished
to apply. If this is a radical proposition, it is easily proved. Recall that Story did find damages to
Charles River Bridge, and did find violation of the contract. Story, one must presume, applying
private contract law principles accordingly would have allowed recovery against Warren Bridge.
How then could Story, who insisted this was a private contract, and that the legislature be
treated as a private party- allow recovery at law or equity against Warren Bridge, which was not
a party to the contract at issue, viz., the Charles River Bridge charter, a contract between the
Massachusetts legislature and the plaintiffs?
Even more fundamental objections to Story's formula are raised in note 79 infra.
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ingful growth in gross national product. He could not do both. Story chose
the latter.
Did Story's choice result from his commitment to private contract law as
an organizing principle in an American Republican society?77 One might with
justice look askance at the claim. If Story were truly following "neutral prin-
ciples" of private contract law, then he should have invoked common law
rules of estoppel, laches, or waiver, because the plaintiffs had failed to bring
suit when the Massachusetts legislature had earlier chartered other competing
bridges. s
""Given his premise that private contract law governed the case, Story's argument is all but
irresistible." Crisis, supra note 3, at 236-37. Contra, notes 78-90, 103-12, 123-31 infra & text ac-
companying.
78See generally Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 24
Mass. (7 Pick.) 344, 390 (1830) (Parker, CJ.) (opinion of the court [see note 65 supra) affd 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) at 473 (Wilde, J.) (separate opinion) affd 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 420 (1837); [Alwyn's] Brief for Defendants, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344, (403), 426 (1830).
One must not, however, assume from the statement in the text that the Charles River
Bridge proprietors had stood by mutely as each new bridge was chartered. On the contrary, the
proprietors, it is submitted, did everything short of filing suit. Before turning to the evidence, it
is necessary to present the conventional wisdom. "The Charles River Bridge owners did not
challenge the Canal Bridge [built in 1807]. They apparently acknowledged the legislature's right
to act; and the success of their own enterprise was such that they could probably afford the luxury of
acquiesence." S. KTrrLER, supra note 3, at 15 (citing no authority).
It is difficult to understand how such a contention can be maintained in the face of the
Warren Bridge proprietors' forthright admission that the Charles River Bridge proprietors had,
indeed, repeatedly protested the chartering of competing bridges. The defendants-appellees simp-
ly argued that precisely because the legislature had rejected such protests, it was clear that the
legislature had consistently refused to recognize any exclusive right in the plaintiffs. [Greenleafs]
Brief for Appellees, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 470.
Kutler also trivializes the Charles River Bridge proprietors' response in 1792 to the charter-
ing of the West Boston Bridge. "In their petition to the legislature, they neither denied the state's
power to create another bridge nor contended that the new [West Boston] bridge was illegal or
violated any vested rigths. Once the state gave them something-in the form of a charter exten-
sion-they came around." S. KUTLER at 14. Such an explanation is as facile as Taney's own: it
adulterates the legal argument. The Charles River Bridge proprietors maintained in 1792, that
the new bridge would not be illegal provided there was just compensation for the old bridge. The
Massachusetts legislature agreed. 1791 Mass. Acts, ch. 62 (March 6, 1792) [West Boston Bridge
charter] (extending Charles River Bridge charter) quoted in 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 550 (1837)
(Taney, C.J.) discussed in note 16 supra. Indeed, even counsel for Warren Bridge emphasized
that "[T]he plaintiffs, at that time ["1792"], remonstrated against the grant of the charter of
West Boston Bridge, on the grounds of their exclusive right; first, as purchasers of the ferry; and
secondly, by their charter of 1785." [Greenleaf's] Brief for Appellees, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at
469. Appellees simply maintained that the Charles River Bridge charter was extended not as com-
pensation, but "on grounds of public expediency, as a mere gratuity." Id. And if there had been
no compensation, then the state had not conceded the existence of an exclusive right in the
Charles River Bridge proprietors. Id. Greenleaf was mistaken on the question of compensation
(note 16 supra), but his argument was at least internally consistent.
N.b. As for the criticism in the text, Newmyer might respond that Story would not have in-
voked these contract rules, on the ground that the uncontested bridges were distinguishable on
the basis of termini, if not function. See Crisis, supra note 3, at 241; quoted in note 51 supra.
Story probably would have circumvented the equitable defenses by drawing just such a distinc-
tion, but his distinctions on the basis of function and termini amounted to a red herring at best,
and at worst a disingenuous (and inconsistent) subterfuge. See notes 85-88 infra & text accompa-
nying. See also note 79 infra.
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What was worse, Story invoked and then deliberately misapplied tort
nuisance cases to support his contract law argument.7 9 His intense reliance on
'The Bridge dissent's reliance on nuisance cases has never struck historians as anything but
unremarkable. Apparently without exception, students of the case have simply understood Story
to have been merely "applying the common law of ferries to bridges," S. KUTLER. supra note 3,
at 99, "[a]s was done throughout . . . the litigation" by the parties and the state judges. Id. at
38.
Story said, "Wherever any other bridge or ferry is so near that it injures the franchise, or
diminishes the toll in a positive and essential degree, there it is a nuisance, and is actionable. It
invades the franchise, and ought to be abated." 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 634-35 (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis added) quoted, but not directly cited, in S. KUTLER at 99. Immediately following this
quotation, Kutler concludes, "Story had a powerful point." Id.; accord, Crisis, supra note 3, at
241 (same argument and conclusion but conspicuously omitting the term "nuisance.").
The [above] rule of law is clear. The application of it must [however] depend upon the
particular circumstances of each case. . . . But whether there be such an injury ["a
nuisance"] or not, is a matter not of law, but of fact. Distance is no otherwise impor-
tant, than as it bears on the question of fact. All that is required, is, that there should
be a sensible, positive injury. [i.e., "any other bridge . . . which diminishes the toll."]
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 634-35 (emphasis added).
Even though Story was at least incorrect in insisting that this doctrine was "also fully
established by the case of Chadwick v. The Proprietors of Haverhill Bridge .... " id. at 634
(cited and discussed in notes 79-80, 100-01, esp. 101 infra), his rule appeared fair enough-stand-
ing alone.
Story, however, did not merely "apply the common law of ferry rights to bridges." His
methodology was far more sophisticated. Earlier in his opinion, in what must be one of the most
ingenious and artfully contrived tour de forces in nineteenth century legal writing, Story made
the following introductory transition from contract law to nuisance law and back:
There is no difficulty in common sense, or in law, in maintaining such a doctrine [that
a charter "may well include an exclusive franchise beyond the limits of the bridge"].
But then, it is asked, what limits can be assigned to such a franchise? The answer is
obvious; the grant carries with it an exclusive franchise to a reasonable distance on the
river; so that the ordinary travel to the bridge shall not be diverted by any new bridge
to the injury or ruin of the franchise. A new bridge, which would be a nusiance to the
old bridge, would be within the reach of its exclusive [charter!] right. The question
would not be so much the fact of distance, as it would be as to the fact of nuisance.
36 U.S. at 614 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
The Justice meant exactly what he said. Not merely analogizing the law of ferries to
bridges, Story now intended to apply nuisance law in order to construe implied charter (i.e. con-
tract) rights] However relevant the intent of the parties might be, it was nuisance law, for Story,
which would define the content and scope of exclusive contract rights where the parties (read
"legislatures") had failed to provide for them.
Story did not say that i a new bridge were a nuisance it "would be within the reach of [the
old bridge's] exclusive right." He said, in effect, a new bridge was a nuisance by definition
whenever the old bridge's tolls were diminished, and hence "within the reach of its exclusive
right." Reasonable distance (Story's putative test of the scope of the implied monopoly right)
equalled that which would not diminish the existing bridge's tolls. A competing bridge which did
siphon off tolls was ipso facto a nuisance which "invade[d] the franchise." 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at
635. See also note 86 infra.
In short, the test was infinitely elastic. Diminution of tolls conclusively proved injury, injury
conclusively proved nuisance, nuisance conclusively proved violation of charter monopoly rights,
and legislative sanction of the nuisance conclusively proved impairment of contract and violation
of the contract clause. See 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 635 ("In the present case there is no room to
doubt upon this point [of "nuisance"] . . . Warren Bridge took away three-fourths of the profits
of the travel from Charles River Bridge. ... ).
One cannot grasp the full implications of Story's sleight-of-hand in these matters unless one
recalls precisely the nature of the original suit in state court. The plaintiffs' bill for preliminary
injunction relied on an 1827 Massachusetts statute conferring equitable jurisdiction upon the
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state supreme court in cases of nuisance. "Resorting to the common law of ferries, Webster and
[Lemuel] Shaw maintained that where a party had exclusive rights, the erection of another ferry
nearby constituted a nuisance if it affected the rights of the existing ferry." S. KUTLER at 36 (em-
phasis added). Chief Justice Parker, for the court, accepted this analogy and the underlying for-
mulation, viz., "that establishing a ferry without right so near to an existing one with vested
rights as to diminish the latter's profits was a nuisance." Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
Thus, the threshold inquiry in the nuisance suit was whether the plaintiffs had a vested
right, (i.e., a condition precedent to maintaining a nuisance suit). But the question of vested
rights turned entirely upon a construction of the plaintiffs' charter-which was silent on the ques-
tion. Precisely because the plaintiffs' claim of monopoly right (based on charter) was not incon-
trovertible, but was in fact a difficult question of first impression and statutory construction, the
state court could not immediately find a nuisance and thus denied the preliminary injunction.
And because the state court later split 2-2 on the question of whether the charter conferred im-
plied monopoly rights, the new charter was sustained and the plea for permanent injunction was
dismissed: the requisite showing of the condition precedent necessary for a nuisance suit had not
been met.
Webster's 1830 argument before the Massachusetts Supreme Court best summarized the
plaintiffs' very precise and disjunctive legal theory.
If the new [Warren B]ridge is not protected by the act of 1827 [Warren Bridge
charter], we say it is a nuisance at common law; if it is so protected, then we say that
the act is contrary to the constitutions of this State and the United States.
Brief for Plaintiffs, Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 24
Mass. (7 Pick.) 344, 427 (1830) affd 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). See also 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) at
442-43 (Morton, J., separate opinion) affd 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420.
Since the state court held that the Warren Bridge charter overtly authorized the construc-
tion of the new bridge, then (even before reaching the constitutionality of the challenged Act)
plaintiffs-at least in theory-had abandoned the nuisance theory altogether. As was seen earlier,
they appealed to the Supreme Court on the only appealable federal question open-the validity
of an act sustained by a state court against a constitutional challenge. See note 23 supra. Accor-
dingly, the federal question (viz. the contract clause question) ostensibly turned entirely upon the
constitutional and common law of contracts (Taney applying public law; Story applying private
law).
Story's arguments (analogizing ferries to bridges) are commonly equated with those made in
state court. In fact, his argument was utterly irreconcilable with those advanced by the parties
and judges in state court. Recall that all of these men agreed that the English and American
common law of nuisance was precise on one point: unless plaintiffs could establish a valid vested
right in themselves, they could never begin to prove a nusiance.
But Story effectively turned the common law of nuisance on its head. The effect was to
subvert or adulterate the entire legal framework of the case. Using his veiled syllogism, he first
(1) focused on the *diminution of the old bridge's revenue to establish the existence of (2) a
nuisance-a state law question "of fact" (per Story, J.) not decided below and not properly before
the Supreme Court-in order to prove (3) the existence of a vested, exclusive toll right in the old
bridge.
None of Story's cited authorities had employed such an approach; they had used the op-
posite approach as the state court proceedings attested. Thus the two state Justices who were
prepared to uphold the plaintiffs' claim of implied right had done so under a will theory of con-
tract (one of them added an eminent domain argument). See S. KUTLER. supra note 3, at 48-50.
Only after deciding the exclusive toll right question did they reach the nuisance question. Story
had put the cart before the horse. More precisely, by making loss of revenue the dispositive test
of nuisance, Story had effectively assumed the very question to be decided: the claim of implied
right. Having found the right, there was nothing left to decide, for if the plaintiffs had a
monopoly right, then (4) the defendants' new bridge certainly infringed upon it. (5) Since the in-
fringement was the direct result of state action (here a statute, the Warren Bridge charter), then
(6) the state itself had impaired a contract, the Charles River Bridge Charter. (7) The Constitu-
tion forbade such impairments, thus (8) the Warren Bridge charter was unconstitutional.
Story's step two should have been step nine, for as even Webster's state court brief conceded, if
the defendants' charter were unconstitutional, it would still be necessary to ascertain (what Story
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one such case, Chadwick v. The Proprietors of the Haverhill Bridge, 80 is il-
luminating for a number of reasons. Story cited, and claimed Dane's
Abridgement" "cites the case . . . as directly in point; that the erection of a
neighbouring bridge under the authority of the legislature is a nuisance to the
ferry. '8 2 By analogy, then, Warren Bridge was a nuisance to the Charles
River Bridge.83 Also by analogy, Story concluded that Chadwick showed that
the latter bridge was bound by common law (and not just charter) to pay
Harvard compensation for its exclusive ferry rights. 8 4
As if to ameliorate the harshly anticompetitive consequences of his for-
mula, Story ostensibly drew a distinction between different modes of transpor-
tation. Newmyer believes that Story's approach allowed one to "distinguish
between [e.g.,] a canal and a railroad in such matters as function and ter-
mini"8 s -in order to minimize findings of damages, and thus, encourage new
competition. At one point, Story's prose did suggest as much.86 Yet, using
himself called) the state law question of "fact," viz, whether and to what extent the new bridge
constituted a nuisance. Story's step two would always require a finding of nuisance on remand.
Because Story's opinion made much of intent and consideration, historians have always
assumed Story's step three (the issue of implied exclusive right) was the only issue. It was an
altogether rational assumption. Was not that issue the only federal question properly before the
court? To be sure, Story pretended to treat only that question, but he resorted to an inversion of
nuisance law to reach his private contract law holding. Story's ruse worked perfectly. There is,
however, no 'principled explanation for Story's artifice on this score. To be sure, "the great
treatise writers of the early 19th century, James Kent and Joseph Story, did not perceive Torts as
a dis rete legal subject." White, The Intellectual Origins of Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671,
672 n.7 (1977) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, it is equally clear that legal commentators as early as
Blackstone did perceive nuisance law as a discrete legal subject-one under the umbrella of
"private wrongs." Id. at 674 n.13 (citations omitted).
Historians have assumed that contract law governed the entire dissent (see, e.g., note 76
supra), without considering Story's 33 page excursis on nuisance law. See 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at
614-47. But only if one acknowledges that Story merged the two bodies of law for the purpose of-
making his argument, can one even contend that private contract law governed Story's result.
'
5(Mass. 1787) [no official report] 2 N. DANE, ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERCAN LAW
ch. 67, at 683, 686 (1824) [hereinafter cited as DANE'S ABR.], cited in 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 625,
634, 647 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting) (citing the Chadwick case as controlling under both of the
dissent's holdings).
822 DANE'S ABR., supra note 80, ch.67, at 683, 686, cited in 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 625; see
note 80 supra.
8236 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 625 (1837) (Story, J., dissenting). See id. at 567-68 (McLean, J., con-
curring); [Dutton's] Brief for Appellants, id. at 432-34, esp. 434; Reconstruction (see id. at 514
n.*) of [Webster's] Brief for Appellants, id. at 523-24.
9336 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 625.
"Id. at 647.
'SCri s, supra note 3, at 241, quoted in note 50 supra (discussed in note 78 supra).
8636 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 613, 634-36 (dissenting opinion). But see id. at 614 ("The question
[of exclusive right] would not be so much as to the fact of distance, as it would be as to the fact
of nuisance."); id. at 620 ("[A] ferr[y is] a franchise, which approaches so near to that of a
bridge, that human ingenuity has not as yet been able to state any assignable difference between
them; except that one includes the right of portage, and the other of passage or ferriage."); id.
at 621, 623, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631 (only test is whether new ferry "draws away the
custom" [revenue] of existing ferry) ("[T]he law will exclude all injurious competition, and deem
every new ferry a nuisance which subtracts from him the ordinary custom and toll."). See
generally note 79 supra.
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Chadwick, Story went on to hold, alternatively, that because the Charles
River Bridge indemnified Harvard, the bridge was the equitable assignee of
the ferry's exclusive rights.87 In other words, Chadwick and other cases, as
construed by Story, foreclosed distinctions between transportation modes.
How then can one maintain, as Newmyer does, "The important point is
that future courts could [draw these distinctions] in function and termini,
and Story's contention about the limited scope of the Bridge ruling would in-
vite them do so"?18 Besides, Story's assurance that "the Court's decision was
limited strictly to the case at hand"8 9 was of no force whatsoever since that
prerogative belonged to the majority-and Taney surely gave no such
disclaimer. Story's actions, moreover, belied his limited-holding theory; Story
thought the ruling was of broad scope-so much so that he considered resign-
ing from the Court in disappointment.90
Why would Story have contemplated so drastic a step after the decision
was handed down? Presumably, Story's defeat at the bar of macroeconomic
jurisprudence was not the primary cause. On the other hand, is one really to
believe that the self-described "last of the old race of judges"91 would resign
because his new Brothers on the bench proved to be judicial subjectivists or
poor scholars, or both? Or because Taney's law was somehow indelicate com-
pared to the "delica[cy]" 92 of Republican law?
Before exploring this mystery, it is necessary to confront directly the other
tier of the economic defense of Story's formula. So far the Note has challeng-
ed only efforts to demonstrate the formula's "workability" and efficacy.
However, as was seen earlier, the revisionist defense also collects three cases93
to disprove the economic critics' complaint that Story's formula "worked only
against the legislature and not the corporation .... "19
The difficulty with this evidence lies in its fundamental inappositeness.
All three examples constitute what legal purists would call "private-private"
contract law. Here the parties in each case were good faith promisees or
"
7 Id. at 647 (dissenting opinion). As a practical matter, the same result obtained under
Story's main holding based purely on charter rights (i.e., no distinctions drawn). Taney rejected
any notion that the plaintiffs could claim under Harvard's title, for the latter was, in Taney's
view, extinguished. See S. KtrrLE, supra note 3, at 87-88 (cited in support of the latter propo-
sition only.)
"Crisis, supra note 3, at 241, quoted in note 51 supra.
"Crisis, supra note 3, at 241.
9sSee note 38 supra & text accompanying.
"Mr. Taney is the Chief Justice. I am the last of the old race of Judges. I stand their
solitary representative, with a pained heart, and a subdued confidence. Do you
remember the story of the last diner of a club, who dined once a year? I am in the
predicament of the last survivor.
Joseph Story to Harriet Martineau (Apr. 7, 1837), reprinted in 2 LETTs, supra note 39, at 277,
quoted in C. SWISHER. supra note 37, at 93.
"See notes 57 & 60 supra & text accompanying.
"Bank of Columbia v. Patterson's Administrator, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 299 (1813); Bank of
the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) (64 (1827); Mumma v. The Potomac Com-
pany, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 281 (1834). See note 50 supra.
"Cris, supra note 3, at 240; see notes 49 & 50 supra & text accompanying.
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creditors to whom Story held corporate promissors liable. The decisions work-
ed neither for nor against legislative will, and the interests of the state were
involved in only the most general way.95
More significantly, while Story's decisions in these three cases may have
worked hardship upon individual corporate defendants, the decisions can
hardly be said to have worked against the institution of the corporation. 96
They were in fact decisions businessmen in the 1830s or today could applaud.
To be sure these cases comport with Republican morality. Still, the true acid
test to discover whether Story's Republican morality worked only against the
legislature is to observe Story in cases where the legislature's interests or ambi-
tions were vitally at stake. If cases like The Dartmouth College Case97 and
The Charles River Bridge Case tell anything about Story's jurisprudence, it is
that he uniformly applied private law principles- treated legislatures like any
other private party to a contract. The grand paradox, of course, is that the
state is almost invariably in the position of grantor, hence under Story's com-
mon law rules, doubts (e.g., questions of implied exclusive franchise) were to
be decided in favor of grantees (i.e., the corporations via the charters from
their states).
In short, the economic critics are inescapably correct in suspecting that
Story's formula worked only against legislatures, or more precisely that the
formula could almost never be invoked in their defense. Surely Taney grasped
this intuitively, hence his subterfuge of royal grant law-in flat contradiction
of Dartmouth College.98 The point here is that Story's subtle rules (spawned
'
5 Newmyer's own characterizations of the holdings in these three cases unintentionally
demonstrate as much. See note 50 supra.
"But see Crisis, supra note 3, at 239-40. ("Using much the same reasoning he applied
against the legislature in the Bridge Case . . . Story worked to enlarge corporate duties and
responsibilities.").
"Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (discussed in
note 58 supra).
"Recall that Taney's royal grant law analogy required doubts in a corporate charter to be
construed in favor of grantors (i.e. legislatures). Accordingly, where, as here, the charter was
silent or ambiguous, the grantees' claim of implied exclusive toll rights must be denied. In the
absence of any exclusive right, a charter granted to a competing bridge (or other transportation
mode) could not impair the first charter. See notes 28-30 supra & text accompanying.
This public contract law approach was antithetical to Dartmouth's private contract law
model, because the latter favored grantees under the original charter in the identical situation.
See notes 30, 31, 58, 59 supra & text accompanying. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that a
royal grant law analogy should control the case, Taney had misapplied it.
Under English common law, only doubts in outright grants were to be resolved in favor of
the king. Uncertainties in royal grantsfor consideration, however, had been resolved for centuries
in favor of grantees, lest the honor of the king be besmirched. Taney completely ignored this lat-
ter doctrine. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 589-91, 593, 597, (Story, J. dissenting); accord, authorities cited
in note 31 supra; see note 106 infra & text accompanying.
Of course, "[t]he present, however, is not the case of a royal grant, but of a legislative
grant, by a public statute. The rules of the common law in relation to royal grants have,
therefore, in reality, nothing to do with the case." 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 598 (Story, J., dissenting);
see id. at 598 passim. See generally notes 119 & 121 infra & text accompanying.
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by Dartmouth College) virtually assured that grantee-plaintiffs would always
prevail. 99
If it is senseless to defend Story's formula on economic grounds, what
then can be said of the dissent's ideological ingredients? The problems with
existing ideological proofs are initially structural. They overemphasize judicial
objectivity, judicial scholarship, and the delicacy of Republican law in the
matrix of Republicanism generally and Story's Republicanism in particular.
What, after all, was a Republican? To paint Story as the antithesis of Taney,
to juxtapose monolithic Republicanism with monolithic Jacksonianism, is to
forget that Taney, and for that matter, Jackson, fashioned themselves
Republicans. 0 0
It is all too easy, moreover, to contrast Story's erudition with Taney's
revulsion for caselaw in order to show first, that Story's disenchantment was
"a matter of scholarship"' 0'° and second, that "Taney was either cynical or in-
competent."10 2 But is not Story's scholarship suspect in light of his selective
invocation of contract doctrines and his devious uses of Chadwick?10 3 Even
assuming one could reconcile Story's strained uses of Chadwick, the fact re-
mains that Chadwick supported none of his propositions. 0 4 However much
"The statement in the text does not mean to imply that Dartmouth itself ineluctably com-
pelled such results; only that Dartmouth provided certain premises which Story could
manipulate. See generally note 58 supra. See also note 125 infra. Under Dartmouth the existence
and extent of an implied exclusive franchise was to be ascertained, at least in theory, by a will
theory of contract. The Bridge dissent, on the other hand, looked to intent, but, in fact, looked
dispositively to nuisance law to determine the scope of the claimed right. The practical effect of
this extremely adroit combination (of Dartmouth's private law doctrine and an inverted nuisance
law theory) was to compel the outcome described in the text. To understand the mechanics of
Story's approach, see note 79 supra.
"'0The point was most recently made by White, supra note 79, at 673-74 & 674 n.11 ("Na-
tional politicians could simultaneously portray themselves as guardians of a simpler, more orderly
republican society and as apostles of democratic progress. Andrew Jackson personified these
tendencies.") (following, inter alia, M. MEYERS. THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION (1957)).
If Crisis, supra note 3, exaggerates the differences between the two Justices, others exag-
gerate the similarities. E.g., G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 391 (1970), quoted with approval in Stephenson, Book Review, 34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 329,
332 n.10 (1972) (review of S. KUTLER. supra note 3).
"Crisis, supra note 3, at 243, quoted in text supra (accompanying note 59).
"02Id.
"'OChadwick v. The Proprietors of Haverhill Bridge, (Mass. 1787) [no official report] 2
DANE'S ABR.. supra note 80, ch. 67 at 683, 686 (1824); 9 DEC. DIG. § 19, item p (1906); see notes
80-88 supra & text accompanying.
"'4Although the report is confusing, all the court appears to have held was that "the act
[authorizing defendants to erect a bridge] did not, and perhaps could not, deprive the plaintiff
of his common law, and constitutional right, to try his title and damages, by a jury in a civil ac-
tion [as opposed to non-jury proceedings]." 2 DANE'S ABR.. supra note 80, at 686 (1824). But cf.
Nelson, supra note 36, at 522 n.54 (compares Chadwick with the Bridge Case in order to
demonstrate that the latter represented "the rejection of established American authority.")
Indeed, even that holding is doubtful because the bridge company's defense on the ground
that the statute authorized construction-the defense successfully made in The Charles River
Bridge Case 50 years later-"was struck out, not being filed in time." 2 DANE'S ABR. at 686.
See also TRANSFORMATION, supra note 3, at 127. Compare id. with id. at 312 n.72. Story omitted
this essential fact.
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one might wish to ascribe the Justice's misreading of Chadwick to simple
carelessness, the evidence forecloses such a charitable inference. 0 5
All the larger questions in the case, including the one Story claimed was decided, "were not
formally decided by the court." 2 DANE'S ABR. 687 (emphasis added). Compare 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
at 625, 634, 647 (1837) (Story, J. dissenting) and id. at 567-68 (McLean, J., concurring) with
Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344,
472 (1830) (Wilde, J., separate opinion) affd 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
'"
5The statement in the text implies, of course, that Story purposely, or at least knowingly,
misinterpreted and misapplied Chadwick. The evidence supports this implication, but the state-
ment in the text is designed to leave open the possibility of a psychodynamic explanation.
Nonetheless, several reasons make it unlikely that Story's misreading of Chadwick was the result
of subconscious or otherwise innocent error.
Language in the Bridge dissent strikingly reveals Story's embarrassed exertions to elevate
Chadwick to the status of controlling precedent. Although neither Taney's opinion nor appellees'
brief had mentioned Chadwick, Story felt constrained to defend his reading of the old case. As if
in anticipation of criticism, Story justified his reliance on Chadwick by arguing,
Notwithstanding all the commentary bestowed on that case to escape from its legal
pressure, I am of opinion that the report of the referees never could have been ac-
cepted by the court, or judgment given thereon, if the declaration had not stated a
right which in point of law was capable of supporting such a judgment. The court
seems, from Mr. Dane's statement of the case, clearly to have recognized the title of
the plaintiff, if he should prove himself the owener of the ferry. Besides, without
disparagement to any other man. Mr. Dane himself, (the chairman of the referees [),]
from his great learning and ability, is well entitled to speak with the authority of a
commentator of the highest character upon such a subject.
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 625 (Story, J., dissenting) (citing 2 DANE'S ABR., supra note 80, ch. 67, 683)
(The Chadwick report actually appears in Dane's treatise at 686-87).
Later in the dissent, Story found it necessary to defend his reading of Chadwick again.
If the Charles River Bridge did not exist, the erection of Warren Bridge would [still]
be a nuisance to [Harvard's] ferry, and would in fact ruin it. It would be exactly the
case of Chadwick v. The Proprietors of Haverhill Bridge; which notwithstanding all I
have heard to the contrary, I deem of the very highest authority.
Id. at 647.
In fact the two cases were, if not entirely disanalogous, at least easily distinguishable. First,
the plaintiff in Chadwick did not claim under a charter. Second, defendant-Haverhill Bridge's
affirmative defense based on charter was struck out having been filed late (see note 104 supra).
Third, the Chadwick court decided almost nothing (see id. and authorities cited therein). To be
sure, Chadwick remains "shrouded in the mysteries of the doctrine of prescription." TRANSFORMA-
TION, supra note 3, at 312 n.72. Granting those mysteries, this Note simply contends that Chad-
wick did not address, let alone hold, what Story said it did. See note 104 supra & text accompa-
nying. Assuming this premise is correct, what then is one to make of Story's belabored apolgia?
Since DANE'S ABRIDGEMENT did not include the underlying declaration in Chadwick, the
above excerpts from the dissent indicate that Story deliberately extrapolated points of law, not
from Dane's report, but instead from the declaration in the Chadwick case. If Story wished to re-
ly on the declaration rather than on Dane, why did he cite only Dane? Moreover, Dane's report
showed that the Chadwick court had declined to enunciate the very doctrines Story now inferred.
See Chadwick v. Proprietors of Haverhill Bridge (Mass. 1787) [no official report], 2 DANE'S ABR..
note 80 supra, ch. 67, at 686-87, discussed in note 104 supra. In short, Story misrepresented
Dane's analysis as well as Chadwick itself.
The misrepresentation of both authorities was compounded by Story's concomitant failure to
cite Dane's source for the Chadwick declaration, viz., "Declarations, Am. Preced. 202," cited in
2 DANE'S ABR. ch. 67, at 686. (This was almost certainly a citation to page 202 of AMERICAN
PRECEDENTS OF DECLARATIONS (B. Perham ed. Boston 1802) (see discussion infra)). There would
have been nothing improper about this omission in the Bridge dissent, but for the fact that Story
was attempting to rely on Dane's source, rather than Dane's report. Under these peculiar cir-
cumstances, what could have possibly prompted Story's silence?
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It is true that on the question of construction of royal grants, Story's
scholarship overwhelmed and refuted Taney's contrary construction.10 6 But
how can that excuse Story's problematic constitutional scholarship? Even
Story's foremost admirer concedes:
Story's dissent was a brilliant attempt, but unfortunately failed to take
account of recent constitutional developments. He surely had the better argu-
ment regarding the common law rules of statutory interpretation but Taney's
reliance on a number of cases holding that states withheld certain powers
when issuing grants, was not as outlandish as Story supposed. In Providence
Bank v. Billings and Pittman,10 7 decided in 1830 by none other than Chief
This Note ventures two possible reasons. Perhaps Story did not cite Dane's source because it
did not support Story's analysis either. (Certainly DANE'S ABRIDGEMENT could be taken out of
context more easily than the terse declaration.) Compare Chadwick v. Proprietors of Haverhill
Bridge (Mass. 1787) (declaration) (Parsons, C.J.) originally published in AMERICAN PRECEENTS
OF DECL.ARATIONS No. 13, at 202 (B. Perham ed. 1802) ("Actions on the Case") ("For erecting a
Bridge near a Ferry") (no commentary by editors) [copy in Beinecke Library, Yale University]
reprinted in id. at 252 (J. Anthon ed. 1810) [copy in Yale Law School Founders' Collection] with
2 DANES ABR. ch. 67, 686-87. Even if Story could have reconciled his interstitial reasoning with
the text of the declaration, his technique still would have been indefensible in light of the Chad-
wick court's limited holding.
There is another reason, however, why Story may have preferred to focus on the declaration
without citing it directly. Had he cited Dane's source, the 1802 version of AMERICAN PRECEDENTS
OF DECLARATIONS, he might have felt obliged to identify its two anonymous editors, which includ-
ed a young Essex, Massachusetts lawyer-Joseph Storyl See generally G. DUNNE, supra note 100,
at 4 & n.32 (citations omitted) (citing Story's claims to authorship).
The Bridge dissent omitted then, not only all reference to Dane's ultimate source, but also
Story's association with that source. Without presuming to judge Story's judicial ethics or
nineteenth-century notions of morality, one may still impute to Story a measure of cynicism. At
the very least, the scholar in Story should have cited his actual source. But the judge in Story
found it convenient not to do so. Query how Story could find room in his dissent for hundreds of
citations (including several from the fourteenth century) (see generally, G. DUNNE at 362, quoted
in note 110 infra) but could not find room to cite the one source he treated as controlling.
[The Note author was unable to inspect originals of the 1802 and 1810 editions of
AMERICAN PRECEDENTS OF DECLARATIONS. Instead, he relied upon photocopies of the Chadwick
declarations as reported in those volumes (copies on file with Indiana Law Journal). These copies
were obtained, at the author's request, through the kind efforts of Mr. RichardJ. Ovelmen, Yale
Law School, Class of 1978-C.L.M.]
1"0 See, e.g., J. MCCLELLAN. supra note 33, at 225 (following M. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER
AND THE SUPREME COURT 134 (1966)); accord, Crisis, supra note 3, at 243; see id. at 236-37;
note 98 supra & text accompanying.
10729 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830). The following excerpts are drawn from the Reporter's official
summary:
In 1791 the legislature of Rhode Island granted a charter of incorporation to cer-
tain individuals who had associated for the purpose of banking. They were incor-
porated by the name of the president, directors, and company of the Providence Bank,
with the ordinary powers of such associations. In 1822othe legislature passed an act im-
posing a tax on every bank in the state, except the Bank of the United States. The
Providence Bank refused the payment of the tax, alleging that the act which imposed
it was repugnant to the [C]onstitution of the United States; as it impaired the obliga-
tion of the contract created by the charter of incorporation. Held, that the act of the
legislature of Rhode Island, imposing a tax, which, under the law, was assessed on the
Providence Bank, does not impair the obligation of the contract created by the charter
granted to the bank.
The power of legislation, and consquently of taxation, operates on all the persons
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Justice Marshall, the Court had held that in construing grants, the relin-
quishment of the power of taxation should never be implied. Marshall's
modified rule of statutory construction caught the searching eye of Taney,
who quoted Marshall at length in support of his opinion in Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge. Story kept silent about the Providence Bank case,
concentrating instead on the weaker points of Taney's reasoning.108
As "a matter of scholarship," one would have thought Story owed Taney an
answer regarding Providence Bank. Moreover, Story's problematic reliance on
the Chadwick case renders the scholarship argument even more suspect. His
holdings in the Bridge dissent wear the patina of irresistibility only if one
allows Story to ignore available common law contract doctrines and counter-
vailing constitutional precedents. He chose not to follow these neutral prin-
ciples.
For over a century, jurists and other legal commentators have remarked
upon Story's cavalier "manner in disposing of contradictory authority."10 9
Certainly a reading of the Bridge dissent confirms such a charge.110 In short,
and property belonging to the body politic. This is an original princile, which has its
foundation in society itself. It is granted by all, for the benefit of all. It resides in
government as a part of itself; and need not be reserved where property of any descrip-
tion, or the right to use it in any manner, is granted to individuals or corporate
bodies.
However absolute the right of an individual may be, it is still in the nature of
that right that it must bear a portion of the public burthens, and that portion must be
determined by the legislature. This vital power may be abused; but the [C]onstitution
of the United States was not intended to furnish the correction of every abuse of power
which may be committed to the state governments. The intrinsic wisdom and justice of
the representative body, and its relations with its constituents, furnish the only security
where there is no express contract, against unjust and excessive taxation, as well as
against unwise legislation generally.
Id. at 514-15 (emphasis added).
'"J. MCCLELLAN. supra note 33, at 225-26; see S. KUTLER, supra note 3, at 98. But cf. G.
GARVEY, supra note 10,:
Taney accomplished this ostensible reversal of Marshall's position without flagrant
disregard of precedent. He worked within the inherited tradition of a constitutional
bricoleur. Indeed, Taney's casting about in the old Supreme Court reports turned up
no fewer than four Marshall Bench opinions in which doctrines had been advanced
that could now be turned to service of the new constitutional jurisprudence. Taney
cited, even quoted, the precedents, resting his argument particularly on Marshall's
holding in Providence Bank v. Billings (1830). Manifestly, the Taney Court remade
Marshall's fabric, but using Marshall's loom, and cutting with Marshall's tools-
quoting passages from that judicial exemplar's own opinions. The justices helped main-
tain the form if not the substance of continuity in American public law.
Id. at 92-93. Taney cited in addition to Providene Bank, Marshall's opinions in Beatty v. Knowles,
2 U.S. (4 Pet.) 168 (1830); Jackson v. Lamphire, 2 U.S. (3 Pet.) 289 (1830); U.S. v. Arrendando,
8 U.S. (8 Pet:) 738 (1834). G. GARVEY at 92 n.14.
'"9E.g., IZobel, Those Honorable Courts-Early Days on the First First Circuit, 73 F.R.D.
511, 530 & n.112 (1976) (citing Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 336
(1837) (Campbell, J., dissenting)).
"
0 See, e.g., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 595-96, 600-01, 625 (1837) (Story J., dissenting). It has
been observed, that
Story's dissent in Charles River Bridge contrasted strangely not only with the
Chief Justice's [viz., Taney's] majority views but also with some of his own, particularly
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neither the scholarship argument nor the portrayal of Story as an objectivist
vox clemente in deserto is persuasive. Like defenses of Story's formula, they
are simply unrealistic. All of these arguments appear overwhelmingly correct
only because the structure of Story's dissent makes them seem so. Buried in
the opinion are the disclaimers, provisos, and omissions which render the
sympathetic explanation fanciful."' Within Story's allegedly controlling
precedents lurked expressly reserved questions."12 The encyclopedic dissent
gave the illusion, but only the illusion, of completeness and authoritativeness.
Becaue no further inquiry appeared necessary, historical explanations
worked like a self-fulfilling prophecy: if Story was despondent over the result,
then post hoc ergo propter hoc, it must have been because the pristine
science of the law had been defiled. And because Taney had presided over
the sacrifice of Story's neutral principles, Story's despair seemed inevitable
and unremarkable.
Such a romanticist explanation for Story's anxiety simply cannot account
for the Justice's own manipulation of legal rules. Story's desperation and sense
of catastrophe had little to do with either rationalism or commitment to
craft. His sense of loss was profound, but what had he lost? What had the
Court surrendered on the altar of economic efficiency?
Power.
"THE ONLY QUESTION HERE IS OF SHEER POWER."
There remains but one final possible explanation of Story's dissent in The
Charles River Bridge Case, one which goes to the essence of Republicanism
itself: Story's dread of the marriage of law and politics. As was seen earlier:
By arguing that there was some principle of public welfare beyond the opera-
tion of the buyer-seller conractual process and by conceding that the
legislature had some special prerogative to voice that principle, Taney came
DeLovio v. Boit. Back in 1815, Story had scoffed at the idea that Lord Coke's In-
stitutes and the statues of Richard II could possibly be relevant norms for the judicial
power of the United States. Now he venerated Lord Coke and sought relevance in
medieval precedents on royal fisheries and manorial advowsons even though he had to
clamber over English authorities to do it ("I am aware, that Mr. Justice Blackstone..
. has laid down some rules apparently varying from what has been stated ... Much
relevance [sic) has also been placed upon the language of Lord Stowell").
G. DUNNE, supra note 100, at 362 (citing DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3776 (C.C.D. Mass.
1815) and 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 591 & 596). Story also said of Blackstone's rules (regarding crown
grants): "If such is his meaning, he is certainly under a mistake." 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 592. Com-
pare G. DUNNE, at 362 with 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 598 (Story, J., dissenting) quoted in note 98
supra with I L. BOUDIN, supra note 6, at 390, quoted in note 11 supra.
"'In addition to the examples in notes 101 and 106 supra, see 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 635
where Story "qualifi[es]" his distinctions regarding function and termini (discussed in notes 50,
84-87 supra) into oblivion. Even without the qualifications, Story's other rules would have
rendered such distinctions meaningless. See note 79 supra. See also note 99 supra.
"'See, e.g., note 101 supra.
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dangerously close to the ultimate democratic heresy-the very one
presumably stamped out by Republican constitutional theory-that the
legislature itself and not the people was sovereign.11
Rather than consider organic sovereignty as merely another of Story's
arguments, imagine for a moment "the ultimate democratic heresy" festering
in Story's mind when he first read Taney's opinion, in preparation for writing
his own reply. It must have occurred to Story that if one were to rail against
Taney's "public welfare" model, one would hardly be so foolish as to confront
it directly.11' Story had to anticipate and diffuse both Taney's pandering and
the appearance of invidious elitism which might otherwise surface in Story's
dissent.
Since all the commentators grant Story's genius, surely one can conceive
of Story constructing his opinion opaquely, in purposely inverse order.", If
Story perceived a "crisis of Republicanism," he surely perceived it immediate-
ly, i.e., in 1831 at the original oral argument when he confided to his diary,
"The only question here is of sheer power. 11 16 He wrote a draft opinion in
1831 which failed to convince the Marshall Court. 117 The case was continued.
Story had six years to research and perfect a persuasive opinion. He did not
'Crisis, supra note 3, at 243, quoted in text supra (accompanying note 59) (emphasis add-
ed); cf. Leslie, Similarities in Lord Mansfield's and Joseph Story's View of Fundamental Law, 1
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 278, 306 (1957) ("The Mansfield-Story concept of fundamental law was con-
sistent with these ideas [of an "absolutist concept of sovereignty"] which in turn were harmonious
with the absolutes of Roman law.")
"
4Recall Taney's emphasis on the happiness of the community and the cruel negative in-
ference. See note 32 supra & text accompanying.
'Indeed, Story's opinion is an imaginative precursor of Brandeisian principles: construe the
statute first, delineate the common law, then reach the constitutional question only if necessary.
See 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 587. But see [Felix] Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes'
Constitutional Opinions, 36 HARv. L. REV. 918 (1923), quoted in G. JACOBSOHN. PRAGMATISM.
STATESMANSHIP. AND THE SUPREME COURT 131 n.54 (1977) (contrasting Taney's Bridge opinion as
an "act of statesmanship" with Story's dissent to "prove that even vast erudition is no substitute
for creative imagination.")
"'[Story's] "Memorandums of arguments in the Supreme Court of the United States begin-
ning with the Jan[uar]y Term 1831 and ending with the Jan[uar]y Term 1832," at 4 (ms. in
Treasure Room, Harvard Law School), quoted in Crisis, supra note 3, at 234 & n.3.
11S. KUTLER. supra note 3, at 3 & app. 172. "Story's opinion was substantially the one he
had prepared in 1831 tailored somewhat to respond to Taney." Id. at 96; accord, id. at app.
172; cf. G. DUNNE. supra note 100, at 362, ("[The Bridge dissent] was almost a set piece of a
Story opinion, and it should have been, for he had first written it back in 1821 [sic?] and
presumably had polished it during the interim.") (citing no authority) (meaning unclear) (1831?).
Compare id. with note 118 infra.
Scholars have often wondered why Story's 1831 opinion did not convince the Marshall
Court-and perhaps Marshall himself. For present purposes, it is sufficient, but still important,
to distinguish between Marshall's 1819 opinion in Dartmouth College (see note 58 supra), which
is indeed irreconcilable with Taney's rationale in Charles River Bridge, and the opinion Marshall
might have written or joined in 1837 had he lived. See S. KurLER at 72 app. 179 ("Chances are"
Marshall would have reached Taney's result in the Bridge Case.) (indirect evidence). See general-
ly R. FAULKNER. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1969).
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need to anticipate the probable counterarguments: the Massachusetts court in
1880 entirely anticipated the Taney-Jacksonian arguments.118
Is it not plausible then that Story's true major premise was to prevent
"the ultimate democratic heresy," legislative sovereignty-at all costs? Allow
the state its way here, Story might have said to himself, and the power of the
judiciary becomes impotent illusion. What appalled Story were the implica-
tions of Taney's royal grant law analogy. English common law construed am-
biguities in the King's outright grants in favor of the king, not because that
was the intent of the parties, but because the king was sovereign.119 Taney
was, in effect, silently equating the legislature with the king. As Kent's letters
and Story's dissent discerned, if the legislature were permitted to avoid its
contracts by cloaking itself in the mantle of Taney's public welfare model,
what was to prevent a future legislature from invoking the same doctrine and
the same unspoken premise to immunize its statutes from judicial review
generally. In other words, if the legislature were sovereign, by reason of its
democratic character, upon what possible grounds could an undemocratic
judiciary presume to overrule the sovereign?
The issue then which the Bridge Case posed for Story was only nominally
the contract clause question. Story's observation that "[t]he only question here
is of sheer power" underscored the real issue: not what is an impairment of
contract but who is to decide what is an impairment of contract. 2 0 What was
"'See Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 24 Mass.
(7 Pick.) 344, 388 (1830) affd. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); Nelson, supra note 36, at 518 n.26
reprinted in ESSAYS. supra note 36, at 151 n.26 (citations omitted). See generally R. DWORKiN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 108 n.1 (1977) (discussing the state court's instrumentalism).
In fact, it is possible to suggest that Story may have begun writing his monumental Bridge
opinion before the second state Supreme Court decision was renderedl As early as 1815, "Story
appears to have developed a practice of prefabricating, at least prewriting, opinions, absolutely
devoid of facts, on suitably undeveloped legal areas." Zobel, supra note 109, at 529 (citing G.
DUNNE, supra note 100, at 129) (examples omitted). Dunne himself says Story wrote the Bridge
dissent in 1821 (see note 117 supra), but apparently offers no evidence. Most likely, however,
"1821" is a misprint which should read "1831."
"'9See 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 589, 597, 599, 642-43, (Story, J. dissenting). See generally id. at
589-606, 647; Crisis, supra note 3, at 232. See also 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 641-47 (Story, J., dissent-
ing) (sovereign's power of eminent domain; legislature is not sovereign). See also note 98 supra.
120The text's characterization of the "real issue" is a deliberate paraphrase of a generaliza-
tion (about contract clause cases) made in 1 L. BOUDIN. supra note 6, at 337, quoted in note 6
supra. By way of caveat, it must be understood that (1) Boudin made the observation in the con-
text of a discussion of The Dartmouth College Case-not The Charles River Bridge Case; (2)
Boudin's own analysis of the latter case neither pursues nor attempts to support his generaliza-
tion; (3) his evidence would not support the text's proposition in any event; (4) Boudin's discus-
sion of the Bridge dissent peremptorily dismisses what Boudin perceived to be Story's "naive" for-
malism. See id. at 390, quoted in note 11 supra. Compare id. with Nelson, supra note 36, at
518-19, 523 reprinted in ESSAYS, supra note 36, at 151-52, 156.
Boudin assumed too readily that Story's opinion amounted to formalism. (This Note, of
course, disagrees with those who still so assume.) Despite his loathing for Story and judicial
supremacy, even Boudin overlooked the possibility of a supremacist interpretation of the Bridge
dissent. See note 11 supra. (This is not by way of criticism. Remember, until 1973-when
Newmyer's article, Crisis, supra note 3, appeared-historians had missed the dissent's ideological
premises almost completely.) The crux here is simply that the Bridge dissent's brilliant illusion of
formalism was so complete that it survived the revisionist interpretation to become part of it.
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at stake was not merely a claim of implied exclusive toll rights, but rather the
doctrinal underpinnings of the Framers' separation of powers doctrine. To
save that doctrine and to justify the judiciary's reliance upon it, Story's dissent
repeatedly remonstrated, "The legislature . . . is in no just sense
sovereign."121
In short, whatever were the doctrinal and prudential merits of the War-
ren Bridge's defense, Story deliberately ignored them: the legislature had to
be reminded of its constitutional status; more importantly, the new Chief
Justice needed to be reminded of the Court's constitutional role. The princi-
ple of organic sovereignty provided Story with the constitutional means by
which to justify "the seeming anomaly of judicial supremacy in a democratic
society."' 22 That would be easy enough. But there was an immense practical
difficulty: how to make this controversial premise palatable. It would not do
to chastize the legislature in a concurrence, only to uphold the challenged
statute. The Justice realized he needed to find an impairment of contract in
order to legitimize his excoriation of the legislature. However, even under
Dartmouth23 and the most expansive application of private contract law
principles, the record in the Bridge Case did not admit of such a conclu-
sion- particularly in light of Providence Bank's'z4 deference to legislatures.
To Story, then, fell the self-appointed and unsavory task of finding an
impairment where none appeared to exist. Certainly Story had left plenty of
maneuvering room for himself in his Dartmouth concurrence,' 2' and other
opinions, 126 for future cases like Charles River Ridge. He now drew upon this
"'36 U.s. (11 Pet.) at 643; repeated at 644. Instead, "[t]he sovereignty belongs to the people
of the state in their original character as an independent community; and the legislature
possesses those attributes of sovereignty, and those only, which have been delegated to it by the
people of the state under its constitution." Id. at 644; see id. at 601-03.
"'The quotation in the text is from Bork, supra note 9, at 2, quoted in note 65 supra,
where it appears in a discussion of Madison's model of the Constitution. Professor Bork was not
referring to Story or the Bridge dissent, but the particular statement in the text is entirely
faithful to Bork's argument. See note 65 supra.
"'Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) summarized
in note 58 supra.
"
4 Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830) summarized in note 107 supra.
1""For all its apparent simplicity, [Story's Dartmouth] doctrine ["of public and private cor-
porations"] had a remarkably protean quality, and it entered the fabric of history not only as law
but as propaganda." Story's Doctrine, supra note 8, at 835. Compare id. with note 99 supra.
"'6E.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). Although Terrett never invoked
the contract clause (compare F. STrrEs, supra note 58, at 132 n.45 with id. at 137 n.49 wth W.
WIECEK, THE SOURcES OF ANTISLAvERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 260-61
(1977)), the opinion's Republican premises dramatically influenced the result in later contract clause
cases.
[I]n the course of that opinion protecting the vested rights of the Episcopal church in
Virginia, Justice Story had defined the legal nature of private corporations. Story
would not admit that legislatures could repeal statutes creating private corporations
and by such repeal transfer their property to others without consent of the corporators.
This decision, Story had thought, stood "upon the principles of natural justice, upon
the fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit and letter of the
[C]onstitution of the United States, and upon the doctrines of the most respected
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concurrence, ignored Providence Bank,1 27 conveniently overlooked Warren
Bridge's equitable defenses as well as flaws in the plaintiffs' argument, and
engrafted a sui generis theory of nuisance law128 to achieve what seined to be
an altogether objective result. It was an extraordinary feat of constitutional
bricolage-at least as remarkable (and disingenuous) as Taney's own.129
Whether Story could have legitimately reconciled Providence Bank with
his Bridge dissent is unclear." 0 What is clear, however, is that Proidence
Bank was decided by Marshall and Story upon purely instrumentalist
grounds-policy considerations almost identical to Taney's Bridge
arguments.'5 ' When Proidence Bank was decided in 1830, Jackson was not
only in the White House, but had already appointed two Justices to the
Supreme Court. Whatever reservations Story harbored at the time about
Jackson and his populism were assuaged by a quick glance at the roster of
old-line Federalist Justices. Moreover, the new Justices were essentially
mavericks, not partisan Democrats."32 Thus despite Jackson's tenure, in 1830
at least, Story did not yet fear for the Republic and the supremacy of the
judiciary. Yet only a year later, at the original oral arguments in the Bridge
tribunals." These were precisely the grounds of Webster's [winning] argument [in Dart-
mouth College].
F. STrrIES at 63 (footnote omitted).
"'See text supra (accompanying note 108).
128See note 79 supra & text accompanying.
"2'But cf. G. GARVEY. supra note 10, at 91-93 (recognizes Taney's achievement but not
Story's; contrasts the former's with what Garvey sees as Story's formAlism). See generally id. at 92
quoted in note 108 supra.
"'0See also Stephenson, supra note 100, at 335.
"'See Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.) (opinion of
the Court). See also R. WELTER, THE MIND OF AmERICA, 1820-1860, app. at 408 n.f (1975).
As if to avoid the potentially unflattering conclusion in the text, it has become fashionable
among Story's apologists to treat as historical accidents both the Providence Bank result and
Story's participation therein. To do so, one historian, for example, is reduced to claiming that
the outcome in Providence Bank was due to"Marshall's inadequate preparation in the common
law" and Story's (unwitting?) "acquiescence" in the opinion. J. MCCLELLAN, supra note 33, at 226
(citing no authority); see S. KUTLER. supra note 3, at 98. But cf. Horwitz, The Conservative
Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 275, 289 passim
(1973) (review of G. DUNNE, note 100 supra, and J. MCCLELLAN) (exposing McClellan's "many
gratuitous slaps at John Marshall," without quoting this particular slur).
It is one thing to say that "Providence Bank unconsciously paved the way for the Taney
coup [in the Bridge Case]." J. MCCLELLAN at 226. But it is quite another to assume as well that
Marshall and Story were unaware of the implications of Providence Bank in 1830 or that they
somehow did not intend what they said. In the absence of some evidence, such academic exer-
tions to cast doubt upon the Justices' consciousness and deliberateness in Providence Bank are
simply outrageous. Nevertheless, one historian has postulated that, "[i]n the Providence Bank
Case Story could [i.e., might] have dissented in silence." Stephenson, supra note 100, at 336 n.27
(citation omitted) (author cites a single 1842 letter in which Story implicitly claimed to have
silently dissented-not in Providence Bank, but in an 1825 slave trade case).
None can disprove these assertions and speculations offered to extricate Story from Pro-
vidence Bank. What can be said with certainty is that such arguments do constitute a convenient
means by which to avoid the obvious inference: Story could be as instrumentalist as Taney in a
contract clause case. Query whether a natural law or formalist interpretation of the Bridge dis-
sent could survive such an inference.
"'See Stephenson, supra note 100, at 334.
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Case, Story foreboded the coming crisis. Worse, he could not convince the
Marshall Court that the power of the judiciary was at stake. Story's prescience
was for nought. By 1837 events had proved Story correct, but by then it was
too late: the Court and the country had changed; Story was an anachronism;
Republicanism was in collapse.
To read the Bridge dissent from this parallax is to see Republicanism not
merely as a goal, but as Story's major premise; to see, if one will, judicial
supremacy as Story's only fundamental principle. For Story, judicial
supremacy equalled Republicanism. If natural law should happen to comport
with Republicanism, it would be, for Story, only a happy coincidence. Con-
versely, if, when, and where natural law were incompatible with
Republicanism, then Story would require natural law to yield to the Framers'
theory. Story regarded formalism and natural law not as surplusage, but as
persuasive authority to be selectively cited and relied upon in order to rescue
judicial supremacy-via the contract clause-not the plaintiff-stockholders,
not even America's macroeconomy.
Similarly, the Bridge dissent's public-private distinction (including Story's
exhaustive exigesis of royal grant law and private contract law) never
qualified as an independent principle in Story's jurisprudence, but was in-
stead a propitious device-a surrogate standard-which could be
manipulated as a case required to achieve and preserve Republican results.
Moreover, this proposed rigid model presupposes even more severe ramifica-
tions: if, for example, in Charles River Bridge, assuming arguendo that na-
tional economic growth must suffer under the dissent's result, that was for
Story, a truly regretted cost of Republican jurisprudence, but it was a tertiary
factor when measured against the necessity of Republican government.
Finally, if in the process, Story discovered that he must himself sacrifice
one of Republicanism's pristine and premier virtues-judicial objectivity-in
order to 'preserve another, even more precious Republican tenet-organic
sovereignty, the sine qua non of judicial supremacy-then Story appeared
ready to pay the price. This is not necessarily an uncharitable conclusion.
Republicanism and the preservation of Republicanism may very well have
been worth it: the end probably did justify the means, if only because they
were essentially inseparable. At a minimum, Story's means and ends were no
less legitimate than Taney's. If Story found the irony of his subjective techni-
que embarrassing (because at odds with objectivity), at least he could recon-
cile himself to it: ignominy as reward for Republican beau geste.
Indeed, the moment one sees Republicanism not merely as an end (i.e., a
society to be preserved), but as an immutable means of adjudicating constitu-
tional cases, Story's Republican jurisprudence is metamorphosed into predic-
table principle-arguably (and ironically), a neutral principle at that,
because applied evenhandedly in all cases, and more ironically, a principle of
neutral derivation, because directly traceable to the Framers' structure of the
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Constitution. 33 Insofar as this model is correct, Story's dissent assumes a
qualitatively different and higher status upon rereading. Even stripped of its
private law disguise, it transcends the merely "reckonable" result to become
an ineluctably principled one. The catch, of course, is that all of Story's other
rules become nonneutral principles; there is something hollow about a neutral
principle that subsumes and subverts all others. Yet in the collision of neutral
principles some choice had to be made. 3 4
1sEven as a merely arguable proposition, the statement in the text requires some explana-
tion. In the first place, the rubric, "judicial supremacy," can stand for at least two different con-
cepts: (A) a process of "extraconstitutional" (i.e., nontextual) creation of new constitutional
rights in violation of the "pure interpretive model"; (B) the supremacy of the judiciary which is
theoretically justified, indeed compelled, by the "pure interpretive model." (Both concepts are to
be distinguished from the principle of judicial independence.) In Story's view, Taney's Bridge ra-
tionale would fall under catagory A, because it endorsed legislative sovereignty. In Story's view,
Story himself would fall under category B. Story also qualifies under category A 0/ as some
believe, Story's contract clause rationale in Dartmouth College (which was applied in the Bridge
dissent) finds no support in the Constitution or in the original understanding of the Framers. See
Story's Doctrine, supra note 28, at 839 (citation omitted); accord, F. STrrIES. supra note 58, at
137 n.47. Contra, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); accord,
[Webster's] Brief for Appellant, Dartmouth College Case, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 551-600, esp.
575 passim (Framers intended contract clause to be a constitutional bulwark against legislative
assaults on private vested rights) (relying on THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (J. Madison)) (citing Flet-
cher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) and New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164
(1812)). See generally F. STITES at 57; B. WRIGHT. supra note 21, at 3-26; Story's Doctrine at
828-35. See also note 126 supra.
Giving Story the benefit of the doubt, he remains in category B. Category B represents a
principle which is itself a principle of "neutral derivation." See Bork, supra note 9, at 2, quoted
in notes 64 & 65 supra. Assuming Story applied the principle of judicial supremacy in all cases,
can it also be said that Story's doctrine was a neutral principle?
The answer reveals a limitation of the neutral principles test, and the elasticity of its defin-
tion. Under one reading, "neutral principles" requires only (a) the neutral application of princi-
ple and (b) sincere belief in the "validity of reasons given for the decision at least in the sense
that [the judge] is prepared to apply them to a later case which he cannot honestly distinguish."
L. JAFFE, supra note 63, at 88, quoted in Bork at 2, quoted in note 63 supra (emphasis added).
In other words, Story, could apply all of his surrogate private law distinctions and his formula of
false economics and still satisfy this neutral principle test-even if he believed in none of
them-so long as he did so consistently. Hence, assuming Story could distinguish Providence
Bank as a tax case, and assuming that future claims of exclusive right would never jeopardize
judicial supremacy, then his supremacist doctrine qualifies as neutral principle-even though it
was not the principle upon which he purported to rely. In other words, the neutral principles test
is not very rigorous at all, and Story could rationalize his results, and the surrender of objectivism
in favor of judicial supremacy.
However, the argument collapses if one reads into the neutral principles test the contradic-
tory and more rigorous requirement that the judge himself "sincerely believe in the principles
upon which he purports to rest his decision." L. JAFFE at 38, quoted in Bork at 2, quoted in note
63 supra (emphasis added). Story would fail this test, because he never purported to rest his deci-
sion on judicial supremacy, but rather upon divers contract principles. Since he could not fall
within the ambit of the neutral principles banners, he would be, by definition, a lawless judge of
the category A variety.
Beyond this, the neutral principles test proves quite unhelpful when neutral principles col-
lide. If Story's public-private distinction was not a surrogate standard but a real one, his incon-
sistency in the Bridge dissent can be excused as the conscious preference of one neutral principle
(judicial supremacy) over another neutral principle (private contract law rules).
"
41One way to test this hypothesis is to remove or add variables in Charles River Bridge. For
example, if there had never been a public-private distinction in Story's day, would Story have
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CONCLUSION
Professor Newmyer implores us to "take Story seriously.""t 5 Yet he, too,
still reads the Bridge dissent uncritically. His evidence, if not his argument,
makes for an eclectic, emphatically self-contradictory portrait of one Justice's
seemingly fickle and discretionary jurisprudence. Yet the instant one redefines
Story's jurisprudence-making it a Republican judicial supremacist theory
rather than a Republican private law theory-Story's dissent in The Charles
River Bridge Case obtains new meaning. Indeed, if one accepts classical
Republican premises and Story's hierarchy of values, the dissent also obtains
new legitimacy.
It was fidelity to the principle of judicial supremacy, and not private law,
which dictated Story's result in the Bridge Case. Fealty to that principle
allowed Story to take solace and endure the slings and arrows of a mostly
venomous press. 3 6 And it was that principle, not contractualism, formalism,
natural law, or economic efficiency, which informed all of his opinions.'5 7
reached a different result? Though one can never know, one suspects not, because to Story,
Republicanism could not yield to legislatures, for law could never yield to politics. Indeed, one
could describe Story's universe of private law as the product of his Republicanism.
Or consider the converse: assume the public-private distinction as enunciated by Story was
universally understood and followed by the Justices (e.g., that royal grants are different from and
superior to legislative grants; that, in any event, royal grants for consideration are to be con-
strued in favor of the grantee, like private contracts). Would these rules have necessarily
guaranteed a victory for the Charles River Bridge proprietors? Probably not, for if the plaintiffs'
claim in any way had threatened Republicanism (it did not here, of course), Story could have
glibly appealed to a whole spectrum and panoply of contract rules to defeat the plaintiffs (e.g.,
estoppel, laches, and/or waiver, because the plaintiffs had failed to take legal action against the
competing Canal Bridge; lack of privity, because the plaintiffs had made no contract with the
defendants, but only with the legislature, etc.).
"sCriis, supra note 3, at 233, quoted in text supra (accompanying note 41).
Newmyer's remonstrance has not gone unheeded. Striking evidence of the renewed interest
in Story is reflected in two new books which reach opposite conclusions about the antebellum
judiciary. Each relies on Story as its chief protagonist and paradigm. Compare Presser, Revising
the Conservative Tradition, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 700, 714 (1977) (review of TRANSFORMATION,
supra note 3) ("All these themes coalesce in the discussion of Joseph Story, whom Horwitz seems
to regard as the most important nineteenth-century jurist. At this level, Horwitz is writing a sort
of judicial biography and is seeking to correct earlier writing on Story. Horwitz has Story par-
ticipating at every stage of nineteenth-century legal development and shows how the philosophy
of Story's opinions mirrored most of the changes in law.") with Ely, Book Review, 53 IND. L. J.
277, 284 (1978) (review of R. BRIDWELL & R. W-IrEN, note 137 infra) ("[T]he authors'
stress on the importance of Justice Story comes close to an indispensable man theory of history.
Describing Story 'as the most learned and scholarly man ever to sit on the high bench,' they at-
tribute in large measure the decline of the common law system to his death.") (citation omitted).
1"For discussion of partisan responses in the press, see S. KtrrLER, supra note 3, at 117-20
and C. SWISHER. supra note 36, at 94.
"'The model could go far to explain, for example, Story's extreme thesis in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), "that Congress is obliged to vest full jurisdiction
in the federal courts." HART & WECHSLER. supra note 23, at 313 (paraphrasing Story) (rejecting
Story's thesis); see Palmore v. United States, 311 U.S. 389, 400-01 & 401 n.9 (1973) (rejecting
thesis). But see Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction,
83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974) (bold defense of Story's thesis), summarized in HART & WECHSLER at 77
(1977 Supplement).
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History has credited later cases, later judges for the establishment of
judicial supremacy. 138 The Charles River Bridge Case reveals that they were
merely emulating "the last of the old race of judges." Lest Justice Story doubt
the continuing vitality of his principles of judicial supremacy and organic
sovereignty in American society, one may assure him that laws, not men, still
govern. As one recent case put it:
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Con-
stitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate ex-
ercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."
. . . Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of
separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme
of tripartite government. . . We therefore reaffirm that it is the province
and the duty of this Court "to say what the law is"...s
C. LEE MANGAS
The model could perhaps also explain Story's exceedingly broad assertion of admirality
jurisdiction in the seminal case of DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3776, at 442 (C.C.D. Mass.
1815). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK. THE LAW OF ADMIRALITY 11 n.36 (2d ed. 1975)
("It is quite impossible to substantiate Story's view . .. and rather clear his expressions there were
at least hyperbolical.").
Significantly, DeLovio's treatment of common law precedents is often seen as utterly irrecon-
cilable with the Bridge dissent's fealty to "the old law." See G. DUNNE, supra note 100, at 362,
quoted in note 110 supra. The proposed model suggests why Story could rationalize his con-
tradictory approaches.
Finally, Story's much criticized opinion for the Court in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842) (overruled in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) could prove to be particularly
vulnerable to a supremacist interpretation. But see R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITU-
TION AND THE COMMON LAW 3 passim (1977) (subtitle: "The Decline of the Doctrines of Separa-
tion of Powers and Federalism") (sustained defense of Story's Swift decision). See generally
Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in American Legal History: A Commentary on Horwitz, [TRANSFOR-
MATION, supra note 3] and on the Common Law in America, 53 IND. L.J. [forthcoming]. See
also Note, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE L.J. 284 (1969) (arguing that Story's hidden pur-
pose in his decision was to insulate the legal profession from popular demands).
'"
5See, e.g., Ely, Book Review, 1977 Wisc. L. REv. 293, 298, 300-301 (review of G. DEN.
NISON. THE DORR WAR: REPUBLICANISM ON TRIAL, 1831-1861 (1976)) (Review traces establish-
ment of American judicial supremacy to the Dorr War (citing DENNISON at 143) and Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)).
"'United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704-05 (1974) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211 (1962) [the first paragraph quoted in the text]) (quoting [in the second paragraph] Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (citing THE FEDERALIST. No. 47. at 313 (S.
Mitchell ed. 1938)).
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